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Rules ofpractice and procedure are devised to promote
the ends of justice, not to defeat them. A rigid and
undeviating judicially declared practice under which courts
of review would invariably and under all circumstances
decline to consider all questions which had not previously
been specifically urged would be out of harmony with this
policy. Orderly rules ofprocedure do not require sacrifice of
the rules offundamentaljustice.*
I. INTRODUCTION
You have been appointed to defend a person in a capital trial. Not
surprisingly, you are terrified. Still, you prepare motions, interview witnesses,
consult experts, research the law, and do everything else necessary for the
defense. Finally, the trial date arrives. Your client is found guilty of murder.
During the sentencing phase of the proceedings, the solicitor says something
*** Hormel v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 552, 557 (1941).
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that strikes you as unfair. In fact, you had made a motion in limine about that
very subject. You stand up and object. The judge immediately overrules your
objection, having already heard your arguments at the motion in limine. After
the solicitor finishes talking, you make sure the judge understood your
objection. He assures you he did and that you are "protected" for appeal. Of
course, you hope the case does not get that far.
Unfortunately, it does-the jury sentences your client to death. You are
devastated. You believe the solicitor's tactics were unfair, and you are
confident that his rhetoric swayed the jury. Nonetheless, this is a great issue for
appeal to the state supreme court. At oral argument, the justices appear
interested and concerned. No one asks you about your objection, and the
Attorney General's office, arguing for the state, fails to mention it. The briefs
focused exclusively on the substance of the claim. Now all you and your client
can do is wait.
Three months later, the court issues its opinion. Examining the advance
sheet, you see the word in bold-AFFIRMED-and your heart drops into
your stomach. Surely the justices did not think that the solicitor's statements
were fair or constitutional. Your hands are shaking as you flip through the
opinion. Then you see the words, hard and cold on the page: "Because we find
defendant failed to state at trial the grounds for his objection to the solicitor's
statements, this issue is procedurally barred and we decline to consider it."
What? The judge had told you that you were protected. That should count for
something, right? Besides, you had made it clear earlier, at the motion in
limine, what your grounds were. Apparently, the state supreme court is going
to let this egregious error go unaddressed just because, with your client's life
at stake, you failed to jump through some stupid, moving hoop.
The preceding situation is nonfiction; however, it is a situation that is not
only entirely possible, but describes an increasingly common scenario in South
Carolina. Before 1991, South Carolina capital defendants benefitted from
lenient policies of error preservation. However, in 1991 the South Carolina
Supreme Court put an end to these policies and began enforcing default rules
that are more draconian than those of any other American jurisdiction with a
death penalty. Furthermore, the South Carolina Supreme Court's decisions
have made it difficult for trial practitioners to discern the rules under which
they must operate. Taken in combination, the strictness of the new procedural
policy, the lack of clarity regarding the applicable rules, and the South Carolina
Supreme Court's often ad hoc approach to enforcing the rules severely inhibit
consideration of capital defendants' rights. Moreover, the current situation
wastes an enormous amount of time and money. This Article explores the
problems with the current situation and proposes a partial solution.
Part II of this Article describes South Carolina's most frequently applied
procedural rules. Part III then outlines the history and philosophy underlying
procedural requirements at trial. Next, Part IV examines the evolution of the
South Carolina Supreme Court's treatment of procedural issues in capital cases
and attempts to discern the proper balance between the state's interest in
3
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finality and efficient administration of its criminal laws, and the capital
defendant's interest in receiving a fair trial. Part V then details the court's
current application of the contemporaneous objection rule, using recent case
law as a guide. Finally, Part VI advocates the adoption of a plain error rule to
address egregious errors in capital cases.
II. SOUTH CAROLINA RULES FOR ERROR PRESERVATION: A BASIC OUTLINE
South Carolina law recognizes the same rules for preservation of error in
all criminal cases, whether capital or noncapital. Although it is not possible to
determine all the rules,' the following discussion attempts to summarize the
rules on which South Carolina appellate courts most frequently rely.
A. The Contemporaneous Objection Requirement
The contemporaneous objection rule requires an attorney to make an
objection contemporaneous with an alleged error as a prerequisite for direct
appellate review of the error.' In addition, the trial judge must actually rule on
the objection.3 For example, in State v. Hudgins4 the solicitor threw a ski mask
at the defendant "during cross-examination in the guilt phase of the trial."'
"Although [defense counsel] objected to the solicitor's behavior, the trial judge
did not rule on the objection and [defense counsel] did not object further or
request curative instructions."6 The South Carolina Supreme Court found this
issue procedurally barred on direct appeal.7
Whether the supreme court considers a particular objection to be
sufficiently contemporaneous appears to depend on the nature of the
objectionable material. For example, when opposing counsel makes an
improper argument, counsel must immediately object to the argument and
obtain a ruling from the trial court.8 Furthermore, the court has held that an
1. While some of these rules are well established, the nuances of others are unclear
and seem to be developed by the South Carolina Supreme Court in an ad hoc manner.
Consequently, capital defense counsel are frequently unaware of what will be deemed adequate
to preserve an issue. This discussion attempts to summarize only the most common rules.
2. See Statev. Southerland, 316 S.C. 377,383,447 S.E.2d 862,866 (1994), overruled
on other grounds by State v. Chapman, 317 S.C. 302,454 S.E.2d 317 (1995); State v. Hoffman,
312 S.C. 386, 393, 440 S.E.2d 869, 873 (1994); State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 69, 406 S.E.2d
315, 328 (1991) (Toal, J., concurring).
3. See State v. Hudgins, 319 S.C. 233, 236, 460 S.E.2d 388, 390 (1995), overruled
on ther grounds by State v. Collins, 329 S.C. 23, 495 S.E.2d 202 (1998).
4. 319 S.C. 233, 460 S.E.2d 388 (1995).
5. Id. at 236, 460 S.E.2d at 390.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See State v. Franklin, 318 S.C. 47, 58, 456 S.E.2d 357, 363 (1995). Franklin
complained on appeal that the solicitor's penalty phase closing argument unfairly injected "an
unreliable factor into the sentencing determination." Id. The South Carolina Supreme Court
[Vol. 50: 1
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appellant waives any objection to an improper argument or question if counsel
fails to object the first time the argument is made, even if counsel later objects.9
Likewise, an objection to a juror must be made before the jury is impaneled 0
unless counsel demonstrates that the basis for the objection could not have been
discovered prior to inpanelment through due diligence." In regard to the trial
judge, counsel must object to an improper or prejudicial comment by the court
as soon as the comment is made; however, if the "tone and tenor" of the
judge's remarks indicate that an objection would be futile, then a failure to
object does not preclude consideration of the issue on direct appeal.' 2
B. Specificity of the Objection
A general objection does not preserve an issue for appellate review.3
Rather, "[a]n objection should be sufficiently specific to bring into focus the
precise nature of the alleged error so that it can be reasonably understood by the
trial judge."' 4 For example, mere statements that evidence is prejudicial do not
satisfy this specificity requirement. 5 The South Carolina Supreme Court
frequently invokes this rule to bar appellate consideration of issues in capital
cases.'
6
refused to address the issue because defense counsel had not objected to the argument at trial.
Id. At least one South Carolina case suggests that, in addition to immediately objecting to an
improper argument, counsel must"have a record made of the statements or language complained
of and... ask the court for a distinct ruling thereon." State v. Black, 319 S.C. 515, 521, 462
S.E.2d 311, 315 (Ct. App. 1995).
9. See State v. Somerset, 276 S.C. 220,221,277 S.E.2d 593,594 (1981).
10. See S.C. CODEANN. § 14-7-1030 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
11. Wilson v. Childs, 315 S.C. 431,436, 434 S.E.2d 286, 289 (Ct. App. 1993).
12. State v. Pace, 316 S.C. 71, 74,447 S.E.2d 186, 187 (1994) (per curiam).
13. See, e.g., State v. Nichols, 325 S.C. 111, 120,481 S.E.2d 118, 123 (1997) (stating
that a general objection withoutspecific grounds is not sufficient to preserve an issue for appeal);
State v. Hess, 279 S.C. 14, 19, 301 S.E.2d 547, 550 (1983) (finding that an objection to "'one
or two inaccurate facts' on a display board is not sufficiently specific to preserve an issue for
appeal).
14. Broom v. Southeastern Highway Contracting Co., 291 S.C. 93, 107, 352 S.E.2d
302, 310 (Ct. App. 1986). Although Broom was a civil case, the same principle applies in
criminal cases. See, e.g., State v. Hoffman, 312 S.C. 386, 393, 440 S.E.2d 869, 873 (1994)
(finding that the trial judge properly admitted certain evidence because defense counsel's
objection was, among other things, "very broadly made").
15. See State v. Millings, 247 S.C. 52, 53, 145 S.E.2d 422, 423 (1965).
16. See, e.g., State v. Bennett, 328 S.C. 251, 260,493 S.E.2d 845, 849 (1997) (barring
a character evidence issue where the defense counsel made a vague objection); State v. Patterson,
324 S.C. 5, 17, 482 S.E.2d 760, 765-66 (1997) (finding that defense counsel's objection to
closing argument was not preserved for review where defense counsel did not state the particular
basis for the objection), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 146 (1997); State v. Ivey, 325 S.C. 137, 142, 481
S.E.2d 125, 127 (1997) (holding argument regarding victim impact evidence to be procedurally
barred where counsel merely interjected that he thought the testimony was "going out of the
bounds," but did not raise a specific objection); State v. MeWee, 322 S.C. 387, 393,472 S.E.2d
235,239 (1996) (holding the issue of whether two aggravating circumstances stemmed from the
same act to be procedurally barred because trial counsel did not state the constitutional basis for
5
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A logical corollary to the specificity rule is the principle that an appellant
may not raise one ground for an objection at trial and then argue another
ground on appeal. Like therule requiring a specific objection, the state supreme
court frequently invokes this rule in capital cases. In State v. Byram7 the South
Carolina Supreme Court refused to consider the defendant's argument that he
should have been permitted to introduce, in mitigation of punishment,
information regarding the identity of the alleged accomplice mentioned in the
defendant's confessions. 8 At trial, the defendant offered the evidence to bolster
his other statements, not to mitigate punishment. 9
C. Motions In Limine
Obtaining a ruling on a motion in limine does not preserve an issue for
direct appeal because a motion in limine is not considered a final determination
of a question.2" In State v. Simpson2' defense counsel moved in linine to
challenge the admissibility of testimony regarding a child's hysterical response
to the shooting of his father.' However, when the solicitor introduced the
testimony at trial, defense counsel failed to object to its admission.'
Accordingly, the supreme court found that the issue was barred on direct
appeal.24
D. Curative Instructions
The South Carolina Supreme Court has held that even when defense
counsel makes a contemporaneous objection, the issue is not preserved for
appellate review if the trial court offers a curative instruction and counsel
his objection).
17. 326 S.C. 107,485 S.E.2d 360 (1997).
18. Id. at 112-13,485 S.E.2d at 362-63.
19. Id.; see also State v. Humphries, 325 S.C. 28, 35, 479 S.E.2d 52, 56 (1996)
(holding arguments were unpreserved where defense counsel objected to victim impact evidence
at trial for lack of notice, but alleged on appeal that the evidence was excessive and that the
prosecutor's acts were prejudicial), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2441 (1997).
20. See, e.g., State v. Simpson, 325 S.C. 37,42,479 S.E.2d 57,60 (1996), (holding
that appellant failed to preserve an issue by not objecting during testimony), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 2460 (1997).
21. 325 S.C. 37,479 S.E.2d 57 (1996).
22. Id. at 42, 479 S.E.2d at 59.
23. Id. at 42, 479 S.E.2d at 60.
24. Id.; see also State v. Hudgins, 319 S.C. 233, 237, 460 S.E.2d 388, 390 (1995)
(noting that a pre-trial motion to prohibit certain victim impact evidence did not preserve the
issue for appeal where there was no contemporaneous objection to the evidence), overruled on
other grounds by State v. Collins, 329 S.C. 23,495 S.E.2d 202 (1998); cf State v. Holmes, 320
S.C. 259,266,464 S.E.2d 334,338 (1995) (holding that an issue raised in a post-trial motion for
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refuses the instruction.5 In State v. Tucker 6 the solicitor suggested that the
defendant may have intended to rape the victim he ultimately murdered. 27
Because no evidence of rape existed, defense counsel objected to the statement
and moved for a mistrial.2" On appeal, the supreme court found the issue
waived because defense counsel refused a curative instruction offered by the
court upon its denial of the motion for a mistrial.29
Similarly, if a trial judge gives a curative instruction on an issue to which
counsel has objected, the defendant waives the issue for appellate review unless
counsel objected to the sufficiency of the curative instruction or moved for a
mistrial. 0
E. Recommendations to Defense Counsel: How to Preserve Errors for
Appeal
As will be discussed more fully later in this Article, 1 the South Carolina
Supreme Court has not clarified what constitutes a sufficient objection in a
capital case. Therefore, attorneys have no foolproof methods for preserving
trial error in South Carolina. However, the following strategies may prove
useful:
Any objection should include all possible legal bases. "[I]t is better to
be overinclusive than underinclusive. ''31 If uncertain whether a
constitutional provision applies, counsel should mention it anyway.
One capital defense lawyer suggests the following objection: "The
accused, John Client, pursuant to the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and [the
applicable provisions of the state constitution, any state statutes or
rules] and other applicable law, moves this Court to .... ,,3 While
primarily focusing on the strongest grounds, "[c]ounsel should assert
allpossible grounds in support of a[n]" argument.34
25. See, e.g., State v. Tucker, 324 S.C. 155, 168-69, 478 S.E.2d 260, 267 (1996)
(holding that the appellant waived his objection by refusing the trial judge's offer of a curative
instruction), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1561 (1997).
26. 324 S.C. 155, 478 S.E.2d 260 (1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1561 (1997).
27. See id. at 169, 478 S.E.2d at 267.
28. See id. at 168-69, 478 S.E.2d at 267.
29. Id. at 169, 478 S.E.2d at 267; see also State v. MeWee, 322 S.C. 387, 393, 472
S.E.2d 235, 239 (1996) (finding that reversal is not mandated because appellant declined the
judge's offer of a curative instruction and did not demonstrate prejudice).
30. See, e.g., State v. George, 323 S.C. 496,510, 476 S.E.2d 903, 912 (1996) (holding
that an objection to the introduction of character evidence is not preserved if counsel does not
"make an additional objection to the sufficiency of the curative charge or move for a mistrial").
31. See infra Part V.
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* Counsel should reference specific cases in raising objections and
making motions. "By citing a case, counsel invokes all of the
principles discussed in that case."'35
" During trial, even a skilled lawyer may forget grounds for objections.
Therefore, it is helpful to file motions in limine and trial memoranda
concerning anticipated issues.36 "Counsel can then incorporate the
memorandum by reference in objections: 'I object based on the
grounds set out in my trial memorandum."'37 The South Carolina
Supreme Court may not recognize this as a fair method for preserving
issues, but adding this phrase after mentioning the obvious bases for
objection can only enhance the defendant's chances of having his
claim heard on direct appeal.
• Counsel must obtain rulings from the trial court.3" As described
above,3 9 a contemporaneous and specific objection may not be
sufficient to preserve an issue; the judge must rule on the issue.
" If counsel objects to a certain line of questioning, counsel should
continue to object and continue to state the relevant grounds every
time the improper material is introduced. Unless counsel objects each
time, the court may find that the defendant waived the earlier
objections through subsequent failures to object.4"
" Finally, there is no substitute for reviewing new rulings regarding
procedural default. Competent counsel should be familiar not only
with the United States Supreme Court's death penalty jurisprudence,
but also with state procedural rules. Unless procedural rules are
followed faithfully, a capital defendant's constitutional rights are little
more than an empty promise.
III. RATIONALE FOR SOUTH CAROLINA'S SCHEME OF ERROR PRESERVATION
South Carolina cases rarely explain the reasoning behind the rules
regarding preservation of errors. However, in State v. Torrence4' the supreme
court explained the rationale for the contemporaneous objection rule. The court
stated that "[a] contemporaneous objection requirement enables trial judges to
make reasoned decisions by appropriately developing issues by way of
argument, both for or against any particular legal proposition."42 The court
adopted the United States Supreme Court's reasoning in Wainwright v. Sykes,
43
35. Id. at 45.
36. Id.
37. Id.
33. See id. at 46.
39. See infra Part II.A-.B.
40. See Bright, supra note 32 at 46.
41. 305 S.C. 45,406 S.E.2d 315 (1991).
42. Id. at 66,406 S.E.2d at 327 (Toal, J., concurring).
43. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
[Vol. 50: 1
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by quoting the following language of that opinion:
A defendant has been accused of a serious crime, and this is
the time and place set for him to be tried by ajury of his peers
and found either guilty or not guilty by that jury. To the
greatest extent possible all issues which bear on this charge
should be determined in this proceeding: the accused is in the
courtroom, the jury is in the box, the judge is on the bench,
and the witnesses, having been subpoenaed and duly sworn,
await their turn to testify. Society's resources have been
concentrated at that time and place in order to decide, within
the limits of human fallibility, the question of guilt or
innocence of one of its citizens. Any procedural rule which
encourages the result that those proceedings be as free of
error as possible is thoroughly desirable, and the
contemporaneous objection rule surely falls within that
classification."
Therefore, the South Carolina Supreme Court recognizes that
considerations of efficiency and accuracy underlie the rule requiring
contemporaneous objections at trial. The contemporary objection requirement
serves efficiency because contemporaneous objections encourage prompt
disposition of the legal questions in a case; the requirement serves accuracy
because contemporaneous objections allow the judge to make immediate
rulings that presumably will ensure the proceeding is relatively free of errors
that would require additional proceedings.
Several commentators have presented the justifications for error
preservation rules more thoroughly.4" Most of these commentators agree that
the various judicial systems in the United States have an interest in finality of
judgments and that error preservation rules, particularly the contemporaneous
objection rule, serve that interest by refusing to address controversies which the
parties did not raise." Professor Daniel Meltzer describes a number of interests
served by state court procedural rules:
44. See Torrence, 305 S.C. at 66-67,406 S.E.2d at 327 (Toal, J., concurring) (quoting
Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 90).
45. See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus
for State Prisoners, 76 HARv. L. REv. 441 (1963) (arguing that the concern for finality in the
criminal law system justifies limited usage of the federal writ of habeas corpus); Graham
Hughes, Sandbagging Constitutional Rights: Federal Habeas Corpus and the Procedural
Default Principle, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 321 (1987-88) (summarizing the reasons
typically given for using procedural default rules to refuse review of alleged constitutional
errors). But see Michael E. Tigar, Foreword: Waiver of Constitutional Rights: Disquiet in the
Citadel, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1, 26 (1970) (arguing for a more extensive judicial consideration of
issues that would ordinarily be deemed waived or defaulted, in part because "[t]he rules of
procedure have really become Platonic forms transcending the reality of the everyday world").
46. See supra note 45.
9
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Rules such as these serve critical purposes: the provision of
adequate notice to adversaries (and the court) of the matters
that are at issue; the allocation of decisions to the appropriate
body; the promotion of focused consideration of particular
questions at different times, when the pertinent evidence and
argumentation can be mustered; and the avoidance of
wasteful proceedings by requiring prompt consideration of
issues upon whose resolution further matters (or the
continuation of the proceeding at all) depend. It is hard to
imagine an effective procedural system lacldng such rules of
the road.47
These procedural rules should not merely serve state interests in finality,
notice to adversaries, efficiency, and other such goals. Rather, they should
reflect a balancing of those interests with defendants' interests in both a fair
trial and vindication of their constitutional and statutory rights. Federal courts
exercising their habeas jurisdiction implicitly recognize this notion by refusing
to honor state procedural rules that do not further "legitimate" state interests 48
47. Daniel J. Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 99 HARV. L. REV.
1128, 1134-35 (1986). Other commentators have articulated similar rationales for these rules.
See, for example, John C. Jeffries, Jr. & William J. Stuntz, Ineffective.Assistance andProcedural
Default in FederalHabeas Corpus, 57 U. CHI.L.REv. 679,695 (1990) (footnote omitted), where
Professors'Jeffries and Stuntz explain:
In addition to its proper interest in finality,
the state has a significant interest in enforcing the
procedural rules that give rise to defaults. States have
good and legitimate reasons for requiring timely
presentation of claims; an orderly adjudicative
process depends on such requirements. It is wasteful
to wait until trial to decide whether the key piece of
government evidence is admissible, and also wasteful
to have a second round of review because the litigant
did not raise the winning claim on the first appeal.
These concerns are no makeweight. Critics of the
procedural default doctrine [in federal habeas corpus
proceedings] argue that "mere" timing rules are not
important enough to justify precluding constitutional
claims, yet virtually no one argues that such timing
rules should be dispensed with in federal practice.
Surely if federal courts are entitled to insist on routine
compliance with sensible procedures in their own
trials, state courts should also be entitled to do so.
48. See, e.g., Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 124 (1990) (refusing to honor a state
procedural requirement where enforcing it would constitute an ""arid ritual of meaningless
form,' .. . and would further no perceivable state interest"') (quoting James v. Kentucky, 466
U.S. 341, 349 (1984) (quoting Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 320 (1958))); Davis v.
Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22, 24 (1923) ("Whatever springes the State may set for those who are
endeavoring to assert rights that the State confers, the assertion of federal rights, when plainly
and reasonably made, is not to be defeated under the name of local practice."); cf. Spencer v.
[Vol. 50: 1
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or that impose unrealistic obstacles to the assertion of federal constitutional
rights.49 In other words, federal courts reviewing habeas petitions will honor
state procedural rules only when the rules provide defendants an adequate
opportunity to present their federal constitutional claims for full consideration.
This Article is not concerned directly with how federal courts should
balance states' interests in finality with defendants' interests in fair trials and
vindication of constitutional rights. Nevertheless, that issue raises two
important questions for either the legislature or the South Carolina Supreme
Court. First, do South Carolina's current procedural rules fairly resolve the
tension between the state's and capital defendants' somewhat conflicting
interests? Second, does the South Carolina Supreme Court's current
application of procedural rules actually serve the rationale articulated for their
existence; namely, allowing judges to make reasoned decisions about
appropriately developed issues? If the answer to either of these questions is no,
then what should be done about it?
Part IV of this Article addresses the first question-whether South
Carolina's procedural rules fairly balance the competing interests of the state
and of capital defendants. Until 1991, the South Carolina Supreme Court
balanced these interests quite differently from the way it presently balances
them. Therefore, the discussion will address the prior method, infavorem vitae
review, and the reasons for the change. Next, it will address the current balance
Zant, 715 F.2d 1562,1573 n.1 1 (lth Cir. 1983) (questioningwhether a Georgia stateprocedural
default rule serves legitimate interests).
49. See, e.g., Morales v. Calderon, 85 F.3d 1387, 1390 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that
a federal court was not barred from reviewing the merits of a constitutional claim when the
applicable state procedural rule was "so unclear that it [did] not 'provide[] the habeas petitioner
with a fair opportunity to seek relief in state court"') (quoting Harmon v. Ryan, 959 F.2d 1457,
1462 (9th Cir. 1992); United States ex reL Williams v. Lane, 645 F. Supp. 740, 748 (N.D. II1.
1986) (holding that no default existed in petitioner's failure to object repeatedly to the
prosecutor's patently unconstitutional statements during closing argument because "federal
courts are not bound by a state procedural rule that sets the threshold for preserving a
constitutional issue so high as to be unreasonable"), aff'd, 826 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1987)
(affirming the district court, but disagreeing with its characterization of the state procedural
rule); see also James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341,348-49 (1984) (holding that the defendant did
not waive a federal constitutional right when counsel requested that an "admonition" rather than
an "instruction" be given to the jury).
The rules described in the text stem from the adequate and independent state ground
doctrine. See 2 JAMES S. LIEBMAN & RANDY HERTZ, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACrICE AND
PROCEDURE § 26.1, at 807-08 (2d ed. 1994). Before refusing to consider a constitutional claim
because the petitioner defaulted the claim under state procedural rules, a federal habeas court
must find that five factors are satisfied, one of which is that the state "procedural violation
provides an 'adequate' and 'independent' state ground for denying petitioner's federal
constitutional claim." Id. at 808; see also Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991)
(finding that in federal habeas proceedings, the procedural default doctrine bars consideration
of federal claims if the petitioner defaulted "pursuant to an independent and adequate state
procedural rule"). For a comprehensive discussion of the adequate and independent state ground
doctrine and the circumstances under which state rules are found inadequate, see LIEBMAN &
HERTZ, supra.
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to determine whether the rules accord sufficient weight to capital defendants'
interests in receiving fair trials and whether these rules serve the purposes
articulated for their existence.
IV. SOUTH CAROLINA'S RESOLUTION OF THE TENSION BETWEEN CAPITAL
DEFENDANTS' RIGHTS AND THE STATE'S INTERESTS IN FINALITY AND
ENFORCEMENT OF ITS CRIMINAL PENALTIES
A. In Favorem Vitae Review: Pre-1991 South Carolina Law
Before May 1991, South Carolina law implicitly took the view that a
capital defendant's right to a fair, constitutional determination regarding both
guilt and sentencing outweighed the State's interests in finality and efficient
administration of its criminal laws. South Carolina's doctrine of in favorem
vitae review in capital cases reflected this perspective. First recognized by
South Carolina courts in 1794,50 "[t]his doctrine requires this Court to review
the entire record for legal error, and assume error when unobjected-to but
technically improper arguments, evidencejury charges, etc. are asserted by the
defendant on appeal in a demand for reversal or a new trial."'" The doctrine
mandated reversal even in capital cases in which the court had "grave" doubts
that the error was prejudicial, because, as the state supreme court stated, "If in
ordering [a new trial] we err, at least such error has not the finality that
affirmance on the present record would have.""2 It is not clear whether, in its
early days, the doctrine of in favorem vitae actually reflected a policy
determination that a defendant's interest in receiving a fair trial outweighed or
equaled the state's interest in execution of its criminal laws. In Torrence Justice
Toal offered the explanation that in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, in
favorein vitae represented an effort to give some weight to the defendant's
interest in a fair trial in a system that otherwise heavily favored the state and
granted a defendant few protections.53
Regardless of what in favorem vitae review originally was intended to
achieve, the doctrine evolved during the 1950s, 1960s, and the post-Gregg4 era
into a powerful tool for the vindication of capital defendants' rights. For
example, of the eleven South Carolina capital convictions reversed between
1962 and 1972, seven were reversed after infavorem vitae review." As one
50. See State v. Briggs, 3 S.C.L. (I Brev.) 8, 9 (1794).
51. State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 60-61, 406 S.E.2d 315, 324 (1991) (Toal, J.,
concurring).
52. State v. Livingston, 233 S.C. 400,409, 105 S.E.2d 73, 78 (1958).
53. See Torrence, 305 S.C. at 61-62, 406 S.E.2d at 324-25 (Toal, J., concurring).
54. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). Gregg ushered in the modem era of
capital punishment in the United States.
55. See State v. Richburg, 250 S.C. 451, 158 S.E.2d 769 (1968); State v. Bell, 250
S.C. 37, 156 S.E.2d 313 (1967); State v. Gamble, 247 S.C. 214, 146 S.E.2d 709 (1966); State v.
Cain, 246 S.C. 536, 144 S.E.2d 905 (1965); State v. Swilling, 246 S.C. 144, 142 S.E.2d 864
[Vol. 50: 1
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commentator notes, these reversals "were in every instance based exclusively
or substantially on State rather than federal precedent or rule of law.""6
Under infavorem vitae, courts had the liberty to look at the entire record.
For instance, in State v. Swilling 7 the supreme court reversed the defendant's
capital conviction based, in part, on improper cross-examination concerning the
defendant's character and reputation."8 The defendant's counsel failed to raise
the improper cross-examination as an issue on appeal. Nevertheless, the court
found that infavorem vitae review permitted it to "independently search[] the
record for prejudicial error, whether or not objected to below or made a ground
of exception here;" 9 consequently, the court explained that "[u]nder all of the
circumstances of the case, we think these questions propounded by the solicitor
on cross-examination were clearly prejudicial."6
In addition to permitting review of unraised or unpreserved issues, in
favorem vitae review further balances a capital defendant's rights by setting a
fairly low threshold for showing prejudice. Thus, in favorem vitae required
appellate courts to reverse convictions in which errors occurred, even when
there were "grave[] doubt[s]" that the errors were prejudicial.6 ' For example,
in State v. White, 2 a capital case involving a rape, the solicitor's closing
argument encouraged the jurors to imagine their wives, sisters, and daughters
in place of the victim. On appeal, the state argued that even if this argument
was improper, there could be no prejudice in light of the overwhelming proof
of the defendant's guilt.6 3 The supreme court disagreed. It found that in addition
to deciding the guilt or innocence of the defendant, the capital jury also
possessed the sole discretion to recommend mercy.' Because the improper
argument could have affected thejury's decision to recommend mercy, reversal
was required:
In view of the absolute discretion of the jury with regard
(1965); State v. White, 246 S.C. 502, 144 S.E.2d 481 (1965); State v. White, 243 S.C. 238, 133
S.E.2d 320 (1963). For a discussion of capital punishment in South Carolina during the pre-
Furman era, see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). For an analysis of in
favorem vitae review as an expression of "deeply felt doubts within that system ofjustice of the
propriety of capital punishment itself," see Laughlin McDonald, Capital Punishment in South
Carolina: The End of an Era, 24 S.C. L. R'v. 762,774-80 (1972).
56. McDonald, supra note 55, at 775. This observation is significant for a number of
reasons, the most important being that federal courts hearing federal habeas claims in capital
cases lack jurisdiction to consider pure issues of state law. Therefore, state courts provide the
only forum for the consideration of certain claims.
57. 246 S.C. 144, 142 S.E.2d 864 (1965).
58. Id. at 150, 142 S.E.2d at 867.
59. Id. at 147, 142 S.E.2d at 865.
60. Id. at 152, 142 S.E.2d at 868.
61. State v. Livingston, 233 S.C. 400, 409, 105 S.E.2d 73, 78 (1958).
62. 246 S.C. 502, 144 S.E.2d 481 (1965).
63. See id. at 506-07, 144 S.E.2d at 482-83.
64. See id. at 507, 144 S.E.2d at 483 (noting that "[t]he duty of the court in that regard
is to see that such discretion is left with the jury").
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to the issue of mercy, it is impossible to determine whether
the argument actually had a prejudicial effect upon the
verdict. We do know, however, that in asking the jury to
determine such issue by relating the circumstances of the case
to their loved ones, the Solicitor injected into the case
considerations foreign to the record and calculated to take
from the trial the necessary element of impartiality. While we
seriously doubt that the argument of the Solicitor had the
claimed prejudicial effect and reach our result with
reluctance, the probabilities of prejudice to the rights of the
defendant are such that we would not be justified in assuming
in a death case that it did not result.
6
Significantly, the in favorem vitae presumption lowered the threshold for
showing prejudice.
The doctrine enjoyed continued vitality in the post-Gregg era. Of course,
the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed many convictions and sentences
under the infavorem vitae standard,6 and continued to reverse several others
based on errors actually raised and preserved at trial.67 Nevertheless, the court
reversed several cases with unpreserved error after reviewing the entire trial
record under infavorem vitae.68 For example, in State v. Smart69 the solicitor's
penalty-phase-closing argument referred to his personal decision to seek the
death penalty against the defendant.70 The solicitor's argument also suggested
65. Id.
66. See State v. Smith, 286 S.C. 406,334 S.E.2d 277 (1985); State v. Plemmons, 286
S.C. 78, 332 S.E.2d 765 (1985), vacated and remanded, 476 U.S. 1102 (1986); State v. Damon,
285 S.C. 125, 328 S.E.2d 628 (1985); State v. Koon, 285 S.C. 1, 328 S.E.2d 625 (1985); State
v. Singleton, 284 S.C. 388, 326 S.E.2d 153 (1985); State v. Lucas, 285 S.C. 37, 328 S.E.2d 63
(1985); State v. Gaskins, 284 S.C. 105, 326 S.E.2d 132 (1985) (per curiam); State v. Chaffee,
285 S.C. 21,328 S.E.2d 464 (1984) (per curiam); State v. Patterson, 285 S.C. 5, 327 S.E.2d 650
(1984); State v. Adams, 279 S.C. 228, 306 S.E.2d 208 (1983); State v. Yates, 280 S.C. 29, 310
S.E.2d 805 (1982) (per curiam); State v. Butler, 277 S.C. 452, 290 S.E.2d 1 (1982); State v.
Hyman, 276 S.C. 559, 281 S.E.2d 209 (1981); State v. Shaw, 273 S.C. 194, 255 S.E.2d 799
(1979).
67. See State v. Diddlemeyer, 296 S.C. 235,371 S.E.2d 793 (1988); State v. Hawkins,
292 S.C. 418, 357 S.E.2d 10 (1987); State v. Riddle, 291 S.C. 232, 353 S.E.2d 138 (1987) (per
curiam); Statev. Cooper, 291 S.C. 332,353 S.E.2d 441 (1986) (percuriam); State v. Adams, 277
S.C. 115, 283 S.E.2d 582 (1981); State v. Woomer, 276 S.C. 258, 277 S.E.2d 696 (1981).
68. See State v. Arthur, 296 S.C. 495,374 S.E.2d 291 (1988); State v. Reed, 293 S.C.
515,362 S.E.2d 13 (1987); State v. Bellamy, 293 S.C. 103,359 S.E.2d 63 (1987); State v. Pierce,
289 S.C. 430,346 S.E.2d 707 (1986); State v. Drayton, 287 S.C. 226,337 S.E.2d 216 (1985) (per
curiam); State v. Peterson, 287 S.C. 244, 335 S.E.2d 800 (1985) (per curiam); State v. Norris,
285 S.C. 86,328 S.E.2d 339 (1985); State v. Elmore, 279 S.C. 417,308 S.E.2d 781 (1983) (per
curiam); State v. Smart, 278 S.C. 515, 299 S.E.2d 686 (1982); State v. Patterson, 278 S.C. 319,
295 S.E.2d 264 (1982); State v. Butler, 277 S.C. 543, 290 S.E.2d 420 (1982); State v. Goolsby,
275 S.C. 110, 268 S.E.2d 31 (1980); State v. Gilbert, 273 S.C. 690, 258 S.E.2d 890 (1979).
69. 278 S.C. 515, 299 S.E.2d 686 (1982).
70. Id. at 526, 299 S.E.2d at 692.
[Vol. SO: 1
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that the police officers who captured the defendant would be "aggrieved by a
sentence less than death,"' and that he and other citizens of Lexington County
"would strongly disapprove of a life sentence."'72 Although the defendant's
lawyer did not object to these arguments, the South Carolina Supreme Court
vacated the sentence and remanded the case for a new sentencing trial.73 The
court reasoned that "[j]urors are simply not to consider the opinions of
neighbors, officials or even other juries.... Capital sentencing is a process
specific to the crime and the defendant, and we admonish bench and bar to be
guided by this limitation."'74 Similarly, in State v. Arthur" the trial judge failed
to question the defendant sufficiently to determine whether he knowingly and
intelligently waived his right to a jury trial.76 Accordingly, the supreme court
reversed the defendant's sentence of death. As in Smart, the court implicitly
applied infavorem vitae review to reverse the defendant's sentence; defense
counsel not only failed to object to the judge's questioning but also stated that
the defendant had "full knowledge" regarding his waiver and had agreed to
71waive his right to be sentenced by a jury.
These and other cases, all reversed under in favorem vitae review,
demonstrate the force that this doctrine had both before and after Gregg.
Although the court did not reverse every capital conviction, the high percentage
of reversals indicates that the doctrine mandated serious consideration of
defendants' claims of error. In balancing the state's interest in finality against
the defendant's interest in a fair trial, the defendant's interest received its due
weight.
B. State v. Torrence: The Abolition of In Favorem Vitae Review
Through Justice Toal's concurring opinion in State v. Torrence, the South
Carolina Supreme Court jettisoned the doctrine of infavorem vitae review and
held that, as in other criminal cases, a contemporaneous objection is required
to preserve issues for appellate review.76 Whether Torrence appropriately
shifted the balance of the state's interest in finality against the defendant's
interest in a fair trial is a question of perspective. The perspective of Justice
Toal and the other concurring justices 79 is clear: Given the panoply of
protections available to capital defendants, appellate court enforcement of a
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 527, 299 S.E.2d at 693.
74. Id. at 526-27, 299 S.E.2d at 693.
75. 296 S.C. 495, 374 S.E.2d 291 (1988).
76. See id. at 497-98, 374 S.E.2d at 292-93.
77. Id. at 498, 374 S.E.2d at 293.
78. See State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 60-69,406 S.E.2d 315, 323-28 (1991) (Toal,
J., concurring).
79. Chief Justice Gregory and Justices Harwell and Chandler joined Justice Toal's
concurring opinion. See id. at 69, 406 S.E.2d at 328.
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contemporaneous objection rule most equitably balances the divergent interests
of the state and the capital defendant. Therefore, retention of the in favoren
vitae standard would accord insufficient weight to important state interests and
would encourage sabotage by defense counsel.
This Article disagrees with the court's perspective and argues that strict,
undeviating adherence to a contemporaneous objection rule-especially one as
unclear as South Carolina's-fails to protect adequately capital defendants. The
court's opinion relied on conjecture rather than hard fact, and consequently
failed to balance appropriately the "cost" of infavorem vitae review incurred
by the state against the protections provided by the post-conviction relief
statute.
1. Analysis of "Dangers "Associated with In Favorem Vitae Review
In abolishing in favorem vitae review in capital cases, Justice Toal's
concurring opinion cited three "dangers" orpotential abuses associated with the
doctrine's use: (1) "sandbagging" by defense attorneys, (2) second-guessing
defense trial strategy, and (3) injecting the trial judge into the adversarial
process.80 Each of the Torrence court's concerns is either exaggerated or
misplaced.
a. "Sandbagging"
First and foremost, Justice Toal's concurrence found that the doctrine
encouraged "sandbagging" by defense attorneys:
The primary danger associated with the doctrine is that a
defendant will deliberately refrain from objecting to an error
which occurs during trial. This is what is referred to by some
as "sandbagging." . .. [Infavorem vitae review] encourages
defense attorneys to purposefully allow error to occur (such
as improper solicitor argument or erroneous charge by the
judge) in a case they feel they are losing at trial, thereby
tainting the trial, while taking comfort that this Court will
reverse a conviction based upon the unobjected-to error.
This strategy may serve in some cases to make more
probable the conviction of a defendant at trial, but the defense
attorney finds solace in an infavorem vitae appellate reversal
and, possibly years later, a new trial with evidence or
witnesses missing.... This practice frustrates the goals of our
80. See id. at 64-66,406 S.E.2d at 326-27 (Toal, J., concurring). In her concurrence,
Justice Toal mentions all three of these as potential dangers, but she does not concentrate on
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criminal justice system-which is designed not only to
protect the innocent but to punish the guilty.81
This language grossly overstates the danger of defense lawyers actually
engaging in sandbagging. Notably, the supreme court provided no authority,
anecdotal or otherwise, to support its accusations. Other courts, particularly
federal habeas courts, are concerned that defense lawyers may be sandbagging
by failing to assert claims in state court and then raising them for the first time
in federal court.82 However, little or no evidence supports the conclusion that
sandbagging occurs. In fact, the available information suggests that capital
defense lawyers rarely sandbag. The American Bar Association Task Force on
Death Penalty Habeas Corpus examined the issue of sandbagging in federal
habeas proceedings and found that "based on the extensive testimony on this
question and our own experience .... capital trial and appellate lawyers rarely
engage in the practice of sandbagging."83
Indeed, the accusation of sandbagging ignores the obvious. Many if not
most lawyers trying capital cases "lack the sophistication required to
'sandbag."'"' Capital trial representation requires extensive time for
investigation, consultation with experts, and other tasks not closely related to
research, legal argumentation, or constitutional law. Yet, to be capable of
81. Id. at 64-65, 406 S.E.2d at 326 (Toal, J., concurring).
82. See, e.g., Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,491-92 (1986) ("Nor do we agree that
the possibility of 'sandbagging' vanishes once a trial has ended in conviction, since appellate
counsel might well conclude that the best strategy is to select a few promising claims for airing
on appeal, while reserving others for federal habeas review should the appeal be unsuccessful.");
Johnson v. Singletary, 938 F.2d 1166, 1173-74 (11 th Cir. 1991) (noting that "federal habeas
review 'may give litigants incentives to withhold claims ... and may establish disincentives to
present claims when evidence is fresh') (quoting McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491-92
(1991)); Cooper v. Wainwright, 807 F.2d 881, 886 (11th Cir. 1986) ("By respecting state
procedural rules, federal courts prevent 'sandbagging,' promote finality, and allow state courts
the opportunity to add their wisdom to the interpretation of the Constitution."). Only under
extremely limited circumstances may a death-sentenced petitioner raise issues not presented in
state court proceedings. See infra Part V.
83. Ira P. Robbins, Toward a More Just and Effective System ofReview in State Death
Penalty Cases: A Report Containing the American Bar Association's Recommendations
Concerning Death Penalty Habeas Corpus and Related Materials from the American Bar
Association Criminal Justice Section's Project on Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, 40 AM. U. L.
REV. 1, 118 (1990). Importantly, the ABA Task Force on Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, which
reviewed the issue of sandbagging, included state and federal judges from states with the death
penalty. In short, the Task Force did not consist of a biased group of abolitionist liberals. Yet
they found the rumors of sandbagging to be greatly exaggerated, noting that "[t]he vast majority
of Task Force witnesses thought that sandbagging was not as serious a problem as is sometimes
represented." Id. at 117.
84. Stephen B. Bright, Death by Lottery-Procedural Bar of Constitutional Claims
in Capital Cases Due to Inadequate Representation of Indigent Defendants, 92 W. VA. L. REv.
679, 693 (1990); see also id. at 693-94 (discussing the quality of representation in capital cases
and arguing, by example, that a lawyer "whose total knowledge of criminal law is 'Miranda and
Dred Scott"' lacks the knowledge to identify and hide constitutional issues at a capital trial).
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sandbagging, counsel must possess a vast storehouse of legal knowledge.
Among other things, counsel "must be completely conversant with federal
constitutional decisions of the state and federal courts throughout the nation
[and] must keep abreast of developments in all of the federal circuits, the state
appellate courts and the writings of commentators," 5 to know what issues are
"percolating" in the courts.86
Appointed counsel in South Carolina will not likely possess the
sophistication necessary to engage in sandbagging because they are not
required to have any capital trial experienceY As a result, many appointed
counsel have no experience trying a capital case. Typically, the solicitor has,
by far, the most experience in death penalty trials and thus enters a trial with
a distinct advantage. Furthermore, the court's discussion of sandbagging
assumes that capital trial lawyers do not try to win at trial, but hold back hoping
for a reversal on appeal. However, all available evidence suggests exactly the
opposite.' Thus, the court's discussion of sandbagging failed to take into
account the available facts. Sandbagging has never been a significant problem
in capital trials.
b. Injection of Trial Judges into the Adversarial Process
The Torrence concurrence also contains unwarranted concern about the
interjection of ajudge into the trial in a quasi-adversarial role.89 However, the
active participation of the trial judge and the solicitor in ensuring that the
capital defendant receives a fair trial is a strength of infavorem vitae review.
This is true for two reasons. First, in favorem vitae review requires the trial
85. Id. at 687-88 (footnote omitted).
86. See id. at 688; see also Bailey v. State, 309 S.C. 455, 424 S.E.2d 503 (1992)
(discussing the demands placed on capital defense counsel); Robbins, supra note 83, at 117-18
("The failure of these trial lawyers to raise an issue is the result of ignorance, not any intentional
withholding.").
87. In South Carolina the court will appoint two attorneys to represent a capital
defendant that cannot afford counsel. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-26(B)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1997). However, the law requires only that one of the two attorneys has at least five years'
experience as a licensed attorney and three years' experience in trying felony cases. See id.
Attorneys are not required to have experience in trying a capital case or even a murder case.
88. For example, many Task Force witnesses testified that sandbagging was unlikely:
The Task Force . . .heard considerable testimony
indicating that the strong tendency of trial and
appellate lawyers is to be far more concerned with
winning at trial or on appeal than with possible means
of relief thereafter; they have little or no inclination
to pass up an opportunity to succeed in their own
endeavors on the chance that some other lawyer
might succeed in a later proceeding.
Robbins, supra note 83, at 117.
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judge to remain alert to the rights of the accused at all times, not merely when
defense counsel rises to object. In a capital trial, this heightened vigilance
should be encouraged; it represents one of the most valuable benefits of
thorough appellate review in capital cases. Second, in favorem vitae review
removes any incentive for a prosecutor to employ unfair or improper tactics in
capital cases. This review requires the prosecutor to be guided by the law as
expounded by the United States Supreme Court and by the South Carolina
Supreme Court, not by an estimation of what might be able to slip past
inexperienced defense counsel in the heat of trial. Take the example of a
solicitor who knowingly (and repeatedly) makes blatantly unconstitutional
statements during closing arguments at the penalty phase of a trial, realizing
that any objection by defense counsel increases the risk that the jury's attention
will be further drawn to the improper argument. With no checks on the solicitor
or the trial court, requiring the defendant to object encourages solicitors to push
the constitutional envelope. In such a situation, the trial judge should intervene
to prevent the solicitor from running roughshod over the rights of the accused.
Whatever its faults or possible excesses, the doctrine of infavorem vitae at least
gives all courtroom players-the defendant, the state, and the trial judge-a
stake in ensuring a fair trial for the capital defendant.
2. Analysis of "Protections" Available to Capital Defendants
The Torrence concurrence also found that strict adherence to a
contemporaneous objection rule does not threaten a defendant's right to a fair,
constitutional trial because defendants enjoy a number of other protections.9"
According to the concurrence, these protections include:
* The availability of state post-conviction relief proceedings;9'
" The availability of federal habeas corpus relief;9"
" The statutory right93 to a proportionality review of a capital
defendant's sentence;94
* The fact that the death penalty may be imposed only after at least one
statutory aggravating factor has been found to exist beyond a
reasonable doubt;9" and
• The availability of state habeas relief as a last resort.
9 6
Citing these protections, Justice Toal concluded that "[t]he conviction of an
innocent person is unlikely under our modem system.""
Much of the concurrence's analysis misses the point. First, the court's
90. See id. at 62-64, 69, 406 S.E.2d at 324-26, 328 (Toal, J., concurring).
91. See id. at 62-64, 406 S.E.2d at 324-25 (Toal, J., concurring).
92. See id. at 64, 406 S.E.2d at 325-26 (Toal, J., concurring).
93. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-25 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
94. See Torrence, 305 S.C. at 64, 406 S.E.2d at 326 (Toal, J., concurring).
95. See id.
96. See id. at 69, 406 S.E.2d at 328 (Toal, J., concurring).
97. Id. at 64, 406 S.E.2d at 326 (Toal, J., concurring).
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focus on whether these protections ensure that only factually guilty persons are
put to death is far too narrow. The question should be whether the judicial
process, including the contemporaneous objection requirement, sufficiently
safeguards a capital defendant's right to be tried and sentenced in accordance
with the United States Constitution, the South Carolina Constitution, and all
available statutory protections.9" Factual guilt is only one of several relevant
factors in considering the legality of a death sentence.
Second, some of the so-called protections cited by the concurrence as
justification for abolishing in favorem vitae review have little to do with
ensuring full review of and redress for constitutional errors during a capital
trial. For example, what does the requirement that an aggravating circumstance
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt have to do with whether a defendant is
protected from an unconstitutional conviction and sentence after a trial at which
his counsel failed to object to legal errors? Indeed, the vulnerability of this
"protection" to the operation of a contemporaneous objection rule is obvious.
Assume, for example, that a jury found the existence of an aggravating
circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt, as required, but this finding was
based, in part, on an unconstitutional reasonable doubt instruction to which
defense counsel failed to object. How reliable was the jury's finding of the
statutory aggravating circumstance? How has the defendant been protected? In
such a case, enforcement of the procedural rule results in the imposition of a
clearly unconstitutional death sentence.
Similarly, it is difficult to understand how the availability of
proportionality review protects against unconstitutionally obtained convictions
and sentences, or otherwise ensures that defaulted constitutional claims will be
aired in some forum. Moreover, the statutory right to proportionality review is
a toothless, paper tiger. Since the South Carolina General Assembly enacted
section 16-3-25,99 the South Carolina Supreme Court has never invalidated a
death sentence for being disproportionate.' 0
The availability of post-conviction relief and federal habeas corpus relief
requires closer consideration. The argument that procedural defaults can best
be redressed in the post-conviction process is not wholly without merit.
Defense counsel may, at times, choose not to object to evidence or an argument
because of the risk involved in calling attention to the problem. At first blush,
98. The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, U.S. CONST. amend.
VIII, requires fair and adequate sentencing proceedings even after an adjudication of guilt. See,
e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (imposing the death penalty under a statute that
prevented the sentencing body from giving independent consideration to mitigating factors
involving the defendant's character or record, or the circumstances of the offense held to be
unconstitutional).
99. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-25 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
100. Additionally, the South Carolina Supreme Court has refused to compare the facts
of a case in which the judge orjury imposed a death sentence to similar capital cases where the
jury or judge imposed a life sentence. See State v. Copeland, 278 S.C. 572, 595-97, 300 S.E.2d
63, 77 (1982) (determining that the death sentence imposed on the appellants was appropriate).
[Vol. SO: 1
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a Sixth Amendment' °' ineffectiveness claim in a post-conviction proceeding
seems to be an appropriate means of distinguishing deliberate and reasonable
trial decisions from failures to object based on ignorance, negligence, or
incompetence. However, an examination of Sixth Amendment law regarding
ineffectiveness demonstrates the inadequacy of a post-conviction proceeding
to remedy trial counsel's inadvertent failures to preserve issues for appellate
review.
Stricklandv. Washington,"' which delineates the standard for determining
whether counsel's representation satisfies the demands of the Sixth
Amendment, requires a petitioner to prove that his attorney's representation
"fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,"'0 3 and that he was
prejudiced as a result."° Counsel's performance falls below Strickland's
"objective standard of reasonableness" only in those rare instances when the
performance is outside the "wide range of reasonable professional
assistance."' °5 A petitioner establishes prejudice under Strickland by
demonstrating "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome"'0 6 of the proceeding. In application, both the ineffectiveness
prong and the prejudice prong are very difficult to satisfy.
Consequently, a finding that trial counsel failed to object to prejudicial trial
error does not compel the conclusion that counsel's assistance was
constitutionally ineffective. This is true for three reasons. First, post-conviction
proceedings turn on judicial dissections of the testimony and motivations of
trial counsel, with no guarantee that such long-after-the-fact determinations will
yield a fair result. Therefore, trial counsel may posit a "strategic" reason for
failure to object when, in fact, none existed. Second, even an admittedly
inadvertent failure to object to prejudicial error does not necessarily constitute
ineffective assistance. The United States Supreme Court has specifically found
that "[s]o long as a defendant is represented by counsel whose performance is
not constitutionally ineffective under the standard established in Strickland v.
Washington... we discern no inequity in requiring him to bear the risk of
attorney error that results in a procedural default."'07 The Court thereby
acknowledges that a failure to raise even a meritorious objection does not
necessarily constitute ineffective assistance. "' Furthermore, although some trial
101. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
102. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
103. Id. at 688.
104. Id. at 687.
105. Id. at 689.
106. Id. at 694.
107. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986).
108. South Carolina's precedent on this question appears to be more favorable than
that of other jurisdictions. Since Torrence, the South Carolina Supreme Court has not had an
opportunity to decide whether a defense counsel's failure to object in a capital trial amounts to
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errors are potentially prejudicial, the errors may not be sufficiently egregious
to meet the relatively demanding "prejudice" standard required for ineffective
assistance of counsel claims. 9 In such cases, courts must consign capital
defendants to execution despite the presence of substantial and prejudicial trial
errors, simply because their counsel's errors were subject to a heightened
standard of prejudice on collateral review. Finally, even if a post-conviction
challenge based on counsel's ineffectiveness proves successful, it represents
years of litigation that conceivably could have been avoided, thus, placing
additional strain on the judicial system."'
There are additional reasons a state post-conviction proceeding is an
inadequate substitute for in favorem vitae review. When a post-conviction
applicant loses at the hearing level, the Attorney General's office usually drafts
the order denying the application. Post-conviction judges typically sign these
orders without making substantive changes, and the South Carolina Supreme
Court employs a deferential "any evidence" standard to review the findings in
the order."' This hardly equals the de novo review a legal issue would receive
on direct appeal.
Generally, a federal habeas proceeding is unlikely to consider the merits
of a defaulted issue at trial because a federal habeas petitioner must prove cause
for and prejudice resulting from an otherwise enforceable procedural default. " 2
In the alternative, the petitioner must show that a "fundamental miscarriage of
justice"' " would result absent review of the alleged error. Ineffective assistance
constitutionally ineffective assistance warranting a new trial. However, a trial attorney's failure
to raise or preserve meritorious objections in non-capital trials frequently has served as a basis
for granting post-conviction relief. See, e.g., Hopkins v. State, 317 S.C. 7, 10, 451 S.E.2d 389,
390 (1994) (finding that trial counsel's assistance was ineffective because counsel failed to
object to an amendment of indictment that changed the nature of the offense from a lesser to a
greater offense); Jolly v. State, 314 S.C. 17, 19-21,443 S.E.2d 566, 568-69 (1994) (finding that
trial counsel's failure to object to hearsay testimony denied petitioner the effective assistance of
counsel); Simmons v. State, 308 S.C. 481,485,419 S.E.2d 225,227 (1992) (finding that defense
counsel's failure to object to the solicitor's comments regarding the defendant's exercise of his
constitutional right constituted ineffective assistance ofcounsel); Gallman v. State, 307 S.C. 273,
277,414 S.E.2d 780, 782 (1992) (finding that counsel's assistance was ineffective for failing to
object to the judge's improper comments to the jury). But see Johnson v. State, 325 S.C. 182,
187-88, 480 S.E.2d 733, 735 (1997) (finding that counsel's failure to object to the solicitor's
improper comment regarding petitioner's failure to testify did not violate petitioner's right to
effective counsel where petitioner could not show that he was prejudiced by this failure).
109. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984); Sosebee v. Leeke, 293
S.C. 531,534-35, 362 S.E.2d 22, 23-24 (1987).
110. See infra Part VI.
11. See, e.g., Cherry v. State, 300 S.C. 115, 119,386 S.E.2d 624, 626 (1989) (stating
that the court uphold the findings of a post-conviction judge if there is any evidence to support
the judge's findings).
112. For a state court's finding of procedural default to be honored in federal habeas
proceedings, the finding must be based on an adequate and independent state ground. Among
other things, this means that the state procedural rule must be "firmly established and regularly
followed." James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341, 348 (1984).
113. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991).
[Vol. 50:1
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of counsel is "cause" for a procedural default, but inadvertent errors that fall
short of ineffectiveness are not."4 Two Georgia cases illustrate the point well.
John Eldon Smith and Rebecca Machetti were co-defendants in a capital
murder case. They were accused of killing Machetti's ex-husband and his wife
so that Machetti's daughters could collect on the ex-husband's insurance
policies. Both Smith" 5 and Machetti" 6 were sentenced to death. However,
neither sentence was constitutional because women were seriously
underrepresented on both juries. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
addressed the merits of Machetti's jury composition claim and granted relief
because the Georgia state courts had previously reached the merits of this
issue."' In contrast, Smith's lawyers failed to timely raise the jury composition
issue. The Eleventh Circuit found that the ignorance of Smith's lawyers
regarding the law supporting the claim did not constitute "cause" for Smith's
default."' Accordingly, the court deemed the issue waived, and Smith was
executed."'9
Additionally, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
which reviews federal habeas cases from the District of South Carolina, has
even more draconian procedural default rules than the South Carolina state
courts. In fact, the court declines to review the merits of claims if there is even
a suggestion of default. For example, in Atkins v. Moore120 the sole potential
aggravating circumstance that allowed the State to seek the death penalty was
a prior murder conviction. The prior murder conviction was marred by obvious
constitutional errors, and Atkins petitioned the state court for post-conviction
relief from the prior conviction. However, the state post-conviction court
applied the state doctrine of laches to bar Atkins's challenge to the prior
conviction.''
When Atkins challenged the prior conviction in federal habeas
proceedings, both the federal district court and the Fourth Circuit found the
challenge procedurally barred because of the state court's application of laches.
Both courts concluded that laches was regularly and consistently applied in
post-conviction relief actions in South Carolina, as required by the adequate
and independent state ground doctrine. 2 1 The courts reached this conclusion
114. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986); see also Jackson v. Herring,
42 F.3d 1350, 1360-62 (1 lth Cir. 1995) (explaining that defense counsel should have objected
to the prosecutor's strikes against all blacks on the venire, although this failure to object did not
support an ineffectiveness of counsel claim).
115. See Smith v. State, 222 S.E.2d 308, 317-18 (Ga. 1976), aff'd sub nom. Smith v.
Kemp, 715 F.2d 1459 (11 th Cir. 1983).
116. See Smith v. State, 222 S.E.2d 308,317-18 (Ga. 1976), rev'dsub nom. Machetti
v. Linahan, 679 F.2d 236 (11 th Cir. 1982).
117. See Machetti, 679 F.2d at 238 n.4.
118. See Smith v. Kemp, 715 F.2d 1459, 1470 (1lth Cir. 1983).
119. See id.
120. No. 97-17, 1998 WL 93409, at *I (4th Cir. Mar. 5, 1998).
121. Id. at *2.
122. Id. at *4; supra note 49.
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despite the fact that laches is, under South Carolina law, a wholly equitable and
discretionary doctrine inherently susceptible to uneven application; laches
had been applied in only one other South Carolina post-conviction relief case,
which was not even a capital case, 24 and the state courts did not apply the
doctrine in at least two other Post-conviction relief cases, both of which
involved delays of approximately the same duration as Atkins's.2
In Kornahrens v. Evatt26 the Fourth Circuit ignored state law in order to
deny a federal habeas petitioner substantive review of his constitutional claims.
Fred Kornahrens, the federal habeas petitioner received a death sentence before
the abolition of infavorem vitae review in South Carolina. Accordingly, the
South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the entire trial transcript without
regard to issues actually raised or preserved by trial counsel; therefore, it
reviewed the merits of all record-based claims. 27 The state supreme court
simply did not apply any doctrine of procedural default in the case.
Notwithstanding the South Carolina Supreme Court's substantive review of the
record-based issues, and its failure to apply any state doctrine of procedural
default, the Fourth Circuit found Kornahrens had defaulted on several issues
by failing to object at trial or to raise them on direct appeal. 2 However, the
federal courts have no power to create a federal common law of default in
federal habeas corpus cases; rather, they may apply only those default rules a
state court has both recognized and actually applied in the case at hand.
The recent case of Johnson v. Moore29 is perhaps the most egregious
example of death by default. In that case, the Fourth Circuit refused to consider
the merits of a Brady3 claim raised by Johnson in state post-conviction
proceedings because, during a closing statement at his resentencing trial,
Johnson told the jury he had "no defense for anything."'' The state post-
123. See, e.g., Archambault v. Sprouse, 218 S.C. 500,508, 63 S.E.2d 449,462 (1951)
("There is no hard or fast rule as to what constitutes laches.").
124. See McElrath v. State, 276 S.C. 282,283,277 S.E.2d 890, 890 (1981) (applying
the doctrine of laches to bar a post-conviction relief application filed seventeen years after the
date of the applicant's conviction).
125. See McDuffie v. State, 276 S.C. 229,231,277 S.E.2d 595,596 (1981) (reversing
a dismissal of a post-conviction relief case involving a fifteen year old conviction); State v.
Patrick, 318 S.C. 352,354,457 S.E.2d 632,634 (Ct. App. 1995) (describing a case in which the
courts granted relief in the form of a new trial, notwithstanding a sixteen year delay between the
time of conviction and the post-conviction relief application).
126. 66 F.3d 1350 (4th Cir. 1995).
127. In Drayton v. Evatt, 312 S.C. 4, 8,430 S.E.2d 517,519 (1993), an appeal from
a denial of post-conviction relief in a capital case, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that
"under infavorem vitae review, all direct appeal errors are assumed to have been reviewed by
this Court, and thus are barred from collateral attack." The Fourth Circuit ignored this holding
in determining that Korahrens had defaulted on his record-based issues.
128. See Kornahrens, 66 F.3d at 1362.
129. No. 97-33, 1998 WL 708691 (4th Cir. Sept. 24, 1998).
130. In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), the Supreme Court established
a rule requiring the State to turn over potentially exculpatory evidence to the defense.
131. Johnson, 1998 WL 708691, at *4.
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conviction court had refused to consider Johnson's Brady claim because of
Johnson's so-called admission of guilt at trial. Despite ample evidence that the
harmless error doctrine formed the basis for the state post-conviction court's
ruling, the Fourth Circuit concluded South Carolina has a regularly applied
default rule which bars review of guilt-phase issues whenever a defendant
makes a closing statement admitting culpability. '32 The Fourth Circuit
completely discounted cases in which the South Carolina Supreme Court
reviewed guilt-phase issues notwithstanding defendants' closing statements,
and spent pages in a futile attempt to demonstrate that South Carolina actually
had this particular procedural default rule. Otherwise the court could not invoke
the default as a bar to federal consideration of the merits of the issue. However,
the dissent in Johnson correctly pointed out that "[i]n effect, the majority holds
that the PCR court erred in its interpretation of South Carolina law. As the
majority itself recognizes, the law of our circuit forbids us from correcting
errors of state law on federal habeas review."'33
In short, in order to avoid reaching the merits of an issue, the Fourth
Circuit was willing to "reinterpret"or "invent" South Carolina law to find a
default rule where, in truth, only a harmless error rule existed. Given the federal
court's default rules and its draconian interpretation of those rules, federal
habeas corpus review cannot substitute for the South Carolina Supreme Court's
infavorem vitae review.'34
In summary, the protections cited by the South Carolina Supreme Court in
132. Id. at *5.
133. Id. at *21.
134. Moreover, federal habeas review of the merits of claims cannot take the place
of searching state court review. Enacted in 1996, the federal Anti Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, § 104, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), limited the federal courts' ability in habeas
proceedings to review a state court's resolution of federal constitutional issues. As amended, 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (1996) provides that application for writ of habeas corpus
[S]hall not be granted with respect to any claim that
was adjudicated on the merits in State court
proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States ....
The Fourth Circuit has interpreted the language in the most restrictive way possible, thus further
limiting federal habeas corpus as a mechanism for meaningful federal review of the
constitutionality of state convictions. See Green v. French, 143 F.3d 865, 870 (1998).
[A decision is] contrary to ... clearly established
Federal law [when] either through a decision of pure
law or the application of law to facts
indistinguishable in a any material way from those on
the basis of which the precedent was decided, that
decision reaches a legal conclusion or a result
opposite to and irreconcilable with that reached in the
precedent that addresses the identical issue.
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Torrence are not a .substitute for in favorem vitae appellate review of
technically defaulted issues. Moreover, the supreme court's fears regarding
sandbagging and disruption of the adversarial process are exaggerated, if not
unwarranted. In reality, Torrence signaled a fundamental shift away from
protection of capital defendants' rights. South Carolina's current
contemporaneous objection scheme accords too much weight to the state's
interest in finality and too little weight to a capital defendant's interest in a fair
trial. This already skewed balance is further exacerbated by the court's rigid,
hyper-technical, and at times inexplicable application of its default rules.
V. THE SOUTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT'S CURRENT APPLICATION OF THE
CONTEMPORANEOUS OBJECTION RULE
As noted above, one must ask not only. what South Carolina's rules
regarding procedural default accomplish in theory, but also what, if anything,
they accomplish in practice. This Part examines the South Carolina Supreme
Court's application of the contemporaneous objection rule in a sampling of
capital cases, with a view toward determining whether the court's reasons for
requiring contemporaneous objections are being well served by the court's
current practices. A review of the relevant case law compels the conclusion that
the court's current practices elevate form over substance. This effectively,
although perhaps unintentionally, thwarts capital defendants' attempts to
receive fair trials.
A. State v. Patterson
In 1995, in State v. Patterson,'35 the State of South Carolina tried Raymond
Patterson for capital murder. Notably, Patterson had been convicted and
sentenced to death twice before, but appellate courts overturned both
convictions.'36 Before Patterson's third trial, Lexington County Solicitor
Donald V. Myers explained to the media that twenty-four persons had already
agreed Raymond Patterson should be sentenced to death and stated, "'Why
should I overrule their opinion?"""7 As a precaution against more improper
statements,' prior to the closing arguments, defense counsel moved in limine
135. 324 S.C. 5,482 S.E.2d 760 (1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 146 (1997).
136. Lisa Greene, Man Goes on Trialfor His Life for Third Time Since '84 Slaying,
THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Feb. 6, 1995, at Al.
137. See id.
138. On several occasions, the state supreme court has reversed death sentences and
convictions due to Solicitor Myers's prejudicial and inflammatory arguments. See State v. Sloan,
278 S.C. 435,438,298 S.E.2d 92,93 (1982) (sentence and conviction reversed); State v. Smart,
278 S.C. 515,517,299 S.E.2d 686, 687 (1982); State v. Gilbert, 273 S.C. 690, 698, 258 S.E.2d
890, 894 (1979). In other cases prosecuted by Solicitor Myers, the South Carolina Supreme
Court found his arguments or comments to be questionable, but not so severe in the context of
the case to warrant reversal. See, e.g., State v. Bell, 302 S.C. 18, 35,393 S.E.2d 364, 373 (1990);
[Vol. 50: 1
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to prohibit improper arguments by the solicitor. Specifically, the motion
objected to arguments "such as the solicitor stating he is standing or speaking
for the victim or anything to suggest that anything but a sentence of death
would be an affront to the memory of the victims."'39 Defense counsel argued
further that such statements are "clearly impernissible .... You can't have any
victim's statements or any kind of statements from the prosecutor suggesting
that the victim's family wants a death sentence."'" During the closing
arguments, Patterson's counsel objected to several statements made by the
solicitor.' However, the trial court immediately overruled the objections,
presumably because defense counsel failed to state a basis for them.
Following the solicitor's argument, defense counsel moved for "a mistrial
based on the improper closing argument." '42 Counsel stated that he was
"concerned in light of Torrencejust how specific the objections have to be."'43
In response, the trial court stated:
Well, you know, each time that he said something, you
did not-I did not allow you each time to state specifically
your objection, but you objected at the time he asked the
question. My idea is that you are protected.
Every time you object-I said when he asked the
question-when he made the statement, you objected at that
time. My idea is you are protected for that particular
statement. On appeal you simply state the grounds then. For
that matter you can do it now or we can do it after this thing
is over with. ,'
Counsel then stated additional objections, including an objection to the
solicitor's "comments that we in any way suggested that Matthew Brooks
killed himself [because that argument] is absolutely unsupported in the
record.' 145 On appeal, the state did not argue that a procedural bar to
consideration of these issues on the merits existed. Moreover, at oral argument
the justices asked no questions concerning whether defense counsel preserved
any objections to the solicitor's closing argument. Nevertheless, the South
State v. Patterson, 299 S.C. 280, 284, 384 S.E.2d 699, 701 (1989), vacated, 493 U.S. 1013
(1990).
139. Record on Appeal at 2253.
140. Id.
141. For example, the solicitor stated, "They tried to say that Mr. Brooks killed
himself," id. at2271, and "anything less than [a life sentence] will be a blight on the life ofwhat
remains of [the victim's widow] and the memory of [the victim]." Id. at 2282. The defense
argued that Mr. Brooks was shot only because appellant's pistol accidentally fired during a
struggle between appellant and Mr. and Mrs. Brooks.
142. Id. at 2283.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 2284 (emphasis added).
145. Id. at 2285.
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Carolina Supreme Court found that the issues were not preserved for review
because defense counsel did not state his grounds for objection during the
closing argument.'
Only a strained and hyper-technical reading of South Carolina's
contemporaneous objection rule could find the defendant's actions insufficient
to merit appellate review. This becomes even clearer when considering the
defendant's actions in light of the concerns articulated in Torrence. In
Patterson the trialjudge was aware of the bases for the defendant's objections
during closing argument, thus satisfying the concern that trial judges should be
permitted "to make reasoned decisions by appropriately developing issues by
way of argument." 47 The judge stated that he had not allowed defense counsel
to state the specific grounds and implied that he understood the grounds.
14
Moreover, far from attempting to "sandbag," defense counsel repeatedly raised
the issues to which he objected. Because the trial judge was satisfied with his
opportunity to rule on the arguably objectionable questions, it is unclear why
the South Carolina Supreme Court considered the objections insufficient. Ifthe
supreme court intends to eliminate the procedural protection of infavorem vitae
review, it should at least consider issues which, while perhaps defaulted in
some technical sense, were raised to and clearly understood by the trial
judge.
149
B. State v. Ivey
In State v. Ivey'50 the South Carolina Supreme Court once again
elevated form over substance. As in Patterson, the court applied its default
rules in an extremely technical manner that ignored the real concerns
underlying the rules.
In Ivey a juror sent a note to the judge explaining that she knew one of the
persons ("Fletch") about whom a witness testified. Both the prosecution and
the defense agreed that the judge should examine the juror about this issue. The
judge asked the juror whether her acquaintance with Fletch would affect her
ability to be fair and impartial. The juror said it would not, and the judge denied
the defendant's motion to remove the juror. The court then recessed until the
146. See State v. Patterson, 324 S.C. 5, 18,482 S.E.2d 760,766 (1997), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 146 (1997).
147. State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 66, 406 S.E.2d 315, 327 (1991) (Toal, J.,
concurring).
148. See Patterson Record on Appeal at 2284.
149. The supreme court recognizes that unpreserved issues can be raised at a post-
conviction relief proceeding through an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See supra note
108 and accompanying text. However, when considering a clear error objected to by trial
counsel, consideration of the issue on direct appeal furthers the ends ofjudicial economy and
conservation of state resources. See discussion infra Part VI.
150. 331 S.C. 118, 502 S.E.2d 92 (1998).
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next morning. Immediately the next morning,' before any testimony was
taken, defense counsel moved to question the juror about her knowledge of
Fletch. The judge denied the motion.'52
On appeal, the defendant argued the trial court erred in denying his motion
to question thejuror. Citing an 1886 case,'53 the South Carolina Supreme Court
found the defendant's request "to ask additional questions of [the juror] was
untimely," and held that "[i]f dissatisfied with the trial judge's examination...
[the defendant] should have immediately moved for permission to make
additional inquiries of the juror."'54 Therefore, the court applied a procedural
bar.55
The finding of default in Ivey is questionable on a number of levels. First,
if the supreme court itself had to reach back one-hundred twelve years to find
the relevant rule, how could defense counsel have notice of a rule so
infrequently applied? Second, all the purposes underlying South Carolina's
procedural default doctrine were satisfied by defense counsel's actions: the
trial judge understood the nature of defense counsel's motion, had an
opportunity to rule, and actually ruled on defense counsel's motion. No one
would argue that defense counsel "sandbagged" the issue. The supreme court's
finding that the motion was untimely is unconvincing, given the lack of any
testimony between the initial questioning of the juror and the request for
additional questioning. The timing of the motion did not prejudice the
prosecution, nor did it disrupt the orderly administration of the trial. Under such
circumstances, what conceivable purpose-other than perhaps an aggressive
appellate policy of finding defaults whenever possible in capital cases-did
application of the procedural default rule serve? Is rationality a part of the
process?
C. State v. Whipple
In State v. Whipple'56 the solicitor's office gave 479 pages of discovery
materials to Whipple's counsel during jury selection, and defense counsel
moved to delay the start of the trial for twenty-four hours so that it could
review the materials.5 7 The trial court delayed ruling on the motion, so counsel
renewed the motion after jury selection. Counsel made this motion three
times. 5 The trial judge ultimately granted counsel slightly more than five
hours to review the materials, during which time counsel also had to prepare
151. Id. at 121,502 S.E.2d at 94.
152. Id.
153. State v. Nance, 25 S.C. 168, 171 (1886).
154. Ivey, 331 S.C. at 122, 502 S.E.2d at 94.
155. Id.
156. 324 S.C. 43,476 S.E.2d 683 (1996).
157. Id. at 50-51, 476 S.E.2d at 687.
158. Id. at 54,476 S.E.2d at 689 (Finney, C.J., dissenting).
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an opening statement and eat lunch. 9 After that time had elapsed, defense
counsel stated that the defense was ready. 60 On appeal, Whipple argued that
he was given insufficient time to review the 479 pages of discovery
materials.' 6' Notwithstanding the three motions and the trial court's ruling
which allowed the defense five hours to review the material, the South Carolina
Supreme Court found that by proceeding to trial without further complaint, the
defendant waived his objection to the amount of time actually granted by the
trial court. 62 In reaching its conclusion regarding waiver, the court relied on a
1979 case, State v. Brown, 63 and a 1954 case, State v. Orr."' Not only are both
cases old and obscure, giving rise to the question of how Whipple's counsel
could possibly have known that they were waiving an objection, but also the
cases appear wholly distinguishable. In Brown, the South Carolina Supreme
Court found that an issue was not preserved for appeal where, at trial, counsel
requested a certain kind of relief and the judge granted counsel's precise
request. 165 In contrast, Whipple's lawyers requested a specific kind ofrelief and
the court denied it. In Orr, the South Carolina Supreme Court found that the
appellant waived any issues regarding jurisdiction, where he not only failed to
raise the issue before trial, but also answered in the affirmative several times
when asked whether he was ready to proceed. 66 As in Orr Whipple's lawyers
stated that "the '[d]efense [was] ready.""'67 However, unlike Orr, they did so
only after moving three times for additional time to consider the state's
discovery response and after the trial court ruled on their motions. Thus, the
"ready" language can only logically be understood to mean "ready in light of
the court's denial of the continuance motion."
D. Conclusion
The cases described in this Part demonstrate that even experienced and
conscientious capital defense lawyers are confused about the requirements for
preserving issues on appeal. Arguably, the procedural default rules, as applied
in capital cases, have become a shell game in which virtually nothing defense
counsel does is sufficient to preserve an issue for appeal. In insisting upon a
159. See id. at 51, 476 S.E.2d at 687.
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. Id. Chief Justice Finney dissented in Whipple, stating: "The majority finds in
the failure to continue to argue with the judge a waiver; I find the issue properly preserved,
and that further argument after the ruling had been made would have been improper." Id. at 54,
476 S.E.2d at 689 (Finney, C.J., dissenting).
163. 274 S.C. 48, 260 S.E.2d 719 (1979).
164. 225 S.C. 369, 82 S.E.2d 523 (1954).
165. Brown, 274 S.C. at 51, 260 S.E.2d at 721. The court explained that "by this
additional instruction the trial judge readily granted the only relief which appellant sought at
trial." Thus, this exception presents no issue for decision by this Court on appeal. Id.
166. Orr, 225 S.C. at 372, 82 S.E.2d at 525.
167. Whipple, 324 S.C. at 51,476 S.E.2d at 687.
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confusing and hyper-technical application of the procedural rules, the South
Carolina Supreme Court ignores both the realities of trial practice and its own
responsibilities for safeguarding capital defendants' interests in receiving fair
trials consistent with the demands of the United States Constitution.
If the contemporaneous objection rule and other state procedural default
rules are to be strictly applied in capital cases, the South Carolina Supreme
Court should issue a clear statement regarding the requirements for preserving
issues on appeal. However, even a clear statement would be insufficient to
protect fully the basic constitutional and statutory rights guaranteed to capital
defendants. Additional protection is needed to preserve these fundamental
rights. The next Part of this Article proposes that either the South Carolina
General Assembly or South Carolina Supreme Court adopt a plain error rule in
capital cases.
VI. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM: THE PLAIN ERROR RULE
The South Carolina Supreme Court's current labyrinthine default
procedures for error preservation in capital cases are both insufficient on paper
and occasionally perverse in their application. First, the rules fail to accord
sufficient weight to capital defendants' interests in being tried and sentenced
in fair proceedings. Second, far from encouraging lawyers to raise
understandable objections upon which trial judges canrule, the supreme court's
"rules" create a vast guessing game in which trial counsel must attempt to
foresee what the court will deem sufficient to preserve the issue. This guessing
game causes repeated unnecessary objections, trial interruptions, and arguments
with trial courts in order to ensure that all issues are preserved. Third, the
current default rules drastically affect future proceedings in both state and
federal courts. In state court post-conviction relief proceedings, applicants are
repeatedly forced to argue that trial counsel was ineffective because trial
counsel failed to preserve the record for appeal when, infact, counsel had made
every effort to object when necessary and to comply with the court's rules on
procedural default. In federal habeas proceedings, even those petitioners whose
counsel made valiant efforts to preserve the record are faced with an uphill
battle to demonstrate that the state court's finding of "default" should not
preclude review of the merits in federal court.
In short, the current application of error preservation rules in capital cases
is no more effective than the more flexible plain error rule would be for
accomplishing the articulated purposes of the contemporaneous objection rule.
The court's refusal to review on direct appeal arguments of which the trial
court had full notice and upon which the trial court actually ruled disrupts the
efficient administration of trials and encourages expensive, duplicative post-
conviction and habeas proceedings. Because the current procedures are
unpredictable, inefficient, and unfair to the accused, additional safeguards are
needed to ensure a means of redress for prejudicial legal errors.
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A. The Plain Error Rule
Unlike every other Americanjurisdiction with the death penalty, the South
Carolina Supreme Court has no plain error rule enabling it to consider
significant issues not preserved at trial.'68 As discussed above,'69 the South
Carolina Supreme Court had relatively generous appellate review procedures
for capital cases prior to Torrence. However, South Carolina catapulted itself
to the opposite extreme in abolishing infavorem vitae.7 Currently, no matter
how obvious orprejudicial an errormay be, the supreme courtwill not consider
it on direct appeal unless the defense counsel objected to the error at trial. As
described above,' what is considered a"sufficient" objection varies from case
to case, making it difficult for defense counsel to know whether an objection
will satisfy the demands of the day. This vagueness places South Carolina far
outside the mainstream, as all other jurisdictions with capital punishment have
a plain error rule to correct unpreserved, but prejudicial, defects at trial.
A plain error rule occupies a middle ground between infavorem vitae and
the rigid (or unpredictable) application of contemporaneous objection rules. A
plain error rule is deferential to both procedural rules and the orderly
consideration of issues, while remaining mindful of the reality that in some
instances glaring, prejudicial errors occur without objection. Furthermore, a
plain error rule provides judicial economy and fairness to the defendant while
avoiding various systemic problems which result from relying solely on
subsequent claims of ineffective assistance of counsel to remedy egregious
errors. In many cases, a plain error rule provides capital defendants with the
only meaningful way to correct significant injustices at their trials.
Accordingly, this Part will describe the operation of a plain error rule,
distinguish it from infavorem vitae review, and argue that a plain error rule
strikes an appropriate balance between the state's interest in finality and a
capital defendant's interest in a fair guilt and sentencing trial.
1. The Federal Plain Error Rule
Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that
"[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although
they were notbroughtto the attention of the court."'' The rationale behind this
168. The federal government and virtually all state and territorial governments also
have plain error rules for noncapital cases. See infra Tables I and 2. Table I provides a list of
jurisdictions with the death penalty and the sources of their respective plain error rules. Table
2 provides a list of the plain error rules in jurisdictions without the death penalty.
169. See supra Part IV.A.
170. See supra Part IV.B.
171. See supra Part V.
172. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b); see also FED. R. EVID. 103(d) ("Nothing in this rule
precludes taking notice ofplain errors affecting substantial rights although they were not brought
to the attention of the court.").
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long-standing policy is clear: "'[A] rigid and undeviating judicially declared
practice under which courts of review would invariably and under all
circumstances decline to consider all questions which had not previously been
specifically urged would be out of harmony with ... the rules of fundamental
justice.'"""7 Although recognizing that an appellate court may need to reach the
merits of an unpreserved issue to prevent an injustice, a court's application of
Rule 52(b), unlike infavorem vitae, has fairly strict limits. In 1993, the United
States Supreme Court delineated the parameters of Rule 52(b):
There must be an "error" that is "plain" and that "affect[s]
substantial rights." Moreover, Rule 52(b) leaves the decision
to correct the forfeited error within the sound discretion of the
court of appeals, and the court should not exercise that
discretion unless the error "'seriously affect[s] the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings."" 74
The Court then elaborated on those requirements. First, the court defined
"error" as "[d]eviation from a legal rule... unless the rule has been waived."'75
Second, the Court observed that "'[p]lain' is synonymous with 'clear' or,
equivalently, 'obvious."" 76 Thus, Rule 52(b) applies only if "the error is clear
under current law."' 77 Last, the error must "'affec[t] substantial rights."" 78
"[Iln most cases it means that the error must have been prejudicial."'79 The
prejudice inquiry must be made against the backdrop of the entire record.'
Under Rule 52(b), unlike other harmless error inquiries, "the defendant rather
than the Government.. .bears the burden of persuasion with respect to
prejudice."'' At the same time, the Court has made it clear that its prejudice
173. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) (quoting Hormel v.
Commissioner, 312 U.S. 552, 557 (1941)); see also United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15
(1985) ("The plain-error doctrine of Federal Rule of Criminal 52(b) tempers the blow ofa rigid
application of the contemporaneous-objection requirement.") (footnote omitted). In rare
circumstances, the United States Supreme Court will consider an error that was not briefed or
argued before it or presented to the court of appeals. See Silber v. United States, 370 U.S. 717,
717-18 (1962) (per curiam).
174. Olano, 507 U.S. at 732 (quoting Young, 470 U.S. at 15 (quoting United States
v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936))).
175. Id. at 732-33. The Court carefully distinguished waiver from forfeiture:
"Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the
'intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right."' Id. at 733 (quoting Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,464 (1938)).
176. Id. at 734.
177. Id.
178. Id. (quoting FED. R. CRiM. P. 52 (b)).
179. Id.
180. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 16 (1985).
181. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734; see also Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,24 (1967)
("[T]he original common-law harmless-error rule put the burden on the beneficiary of the error
either to prove that there was no injury or to suffer a reversal of his erroneously obtained
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requirement in the context of direct appeal is significantly lower than that
required in collateral proceedings. 8
2. Contrasting Plain Error and In Favorem Vitae
The differences between the plain error rule and in favorem vitae are
significant. Because any alleged error must be "plain" or "obvious" under a
plain error rule, that rule would not apply in a situation in which "'a convicted
person, given time for research, can come up with some sort of theory
ostensibly warranting a new trial."" 83 Furthermore, the plain error rule places
the burden of showing that there was a reasonable probability that the error
affected the outcome of the proceedings on the defendant. By contrast, under
in favorem vitae, the South Carolina Supreme Court conducts its own
painstaking inspection of the record and, based on its assessment, determines
whether to apply infavorem vitae to the particular case.8 4
The prejudice requirement ofa plain error rule also substantially abates any
conceivable risk of sandbagging. Because in favoremn vitae review required
inspection of the record of a capital case for even "technical" errors, counsel
conceivably could have sandbagged an issue if it appeared that his client was
going to lose.'85 Sandbagging enables counsel to salvage a losing case by
raising a technical issue later. 86 This stratagem fails under a plain error rule.
First, plain error does not apply to merely "technical" errors, including
evidentiary rulings and jury charges; the rule applies only to errors affecting
substantial rights."8 Second, on appeal the defendant would be required to
prove more than mere prejudice. A plain error rule would come into play only
if it appears reasonably likely that the error complained of affected the trial's
outcome.
All jurisdictions with plain error rules generally require that the error either
judgment.").
182. See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 166 (1982).
183. State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 63, 406 S.E.2d 315, 325 (1991) (Toal, J.,
concurring) (quoting Anderson v. Leeke, 271 S.C. 435, 441, 248 S.E.2d 120, 123 (1978)); see
also United States v. Rodriguez, 882 F.2d 1059, 1064 (6th Cir. 1989) ("Plain errors are limited
to those so objectionable that they should have been apparent to the trial judge or that strike at
the fundamental fairness, honesty or public reputation of the trial.").
184. See Drayton v. Evatt, 312 S.C. 4, 8, 430 S.E.2d 517, 519 (1993).
185. As discussed before, the South Carolina Supreme Court based its statement that
infavorem vitae review encouraged sandbagging by defense counsel wholly upon speculation,
and this hypothesis is contradicted by the available evidence. See supra Part IV.B.I.a. Virtually
any possibility of sandbagging, however remote, is eliminated by substitution of a plain error
rule for infavorem vitae review.
186. See Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179, 190-91 (1963) ("[W]e are not
concerned with whether the instruction was right, but only whether, assuming it was wrong, it
was a plain error or defect 'affecting substantial rights' under Rule 52(b) ... .
187. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993).
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resulted in prejudice or undermined the fairness of the proceedings. 8 For
example, the Supreme Court of North Carolina has limited application of the
plain error doctrine to six identified areas:
(1) a fundamental error, meaning ."something so basic, so prejudicial,
so lacking in its elements that justice cannot be done[,]"' or
(2) a grave error, which must amount "'to a denial of a fundamental
right of the accused,"' or
(3) an error that has "'resulted in a miscarriage of justice,"' or
(4) an error that denies appellant of "'a fair trial,"' or
(5) an error that "'seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public
reputation ofjudicial proceedings,"' or
(6) "where it can be fairly said that 'the instructional mistake had a
probable impact on the jury's finding that the defendant was
guilty.""
8 9
The adoption of limitations similar to North Carolina's would prevent any
abusive practices by capital defense counsel. When an error is so serious as to
deny a fundamental right of the accused, such as the right to a fair trial, counsel
lacks any incentive to sandbag.
B. Benefits of a Plain Error Rule
1. Fundamental Fairness to a Capital Defendant
Courts generally recognize that plain error rules are especially important
in criminal cases.' If a plain error rule is considered especially important in
criminal cases, then it is even more urgent in capital cases. The South Carolina
188. See infra Tables 1 and 2.
189. State v. Reilly, 321 S.E.2d 564, 569 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (quoting State v.
Odom, 300 S.E.2d 375, 378 (N.C. 1983) (quoting United States v. McCaskill, 676 F.2d 995,
1002 (4th Cir. 1982))) (citations omitted); see also Wilson v. People, 743 P.2d 415,420 (Colo.
1987) (en bane) (noting that plain error must rise to a level which "so undermine[s] the
fundamental fairness of the trial itself as to cast serious doubt on the reliability of the judgment
of conviction"); Tharpe v. State, 416 S.E.2d 78, 82 (Ga. 1992) (stating that the test for
unpreserved error "is whether the improper argument in reasonable probability changed the
result of the trial"); State v. Desjardins, 401 A.2d 165, 170 (Me. 1979) (noting that plain error
is triggered by a showing that "the defendant appellant was deprived of the fundamental fair trial
to which he was constitutionally entitled"); Lindstrom v. Yellow Taxi Co., 214 N.W.2d 672,676
(Minn. 1974) (noting that plain error "'destroy[s] the substantial correctness of the charge as a
whole,' cause[s] a miscarriage ofjustice, orresults] in substantial prejudice" (quoting Adelmann
v. Elk River Lumber Co., 65 N.W.2d 661, 667 (Minn. 1954))) (footnotes omitted).
190. See, e.g., United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936) ("In exceptional
circumstances, especially in criminal cases, appellate courts, in the public interest, may, of their
own motion, notice errors to which no exception has been taken, if the errors are obvious, or if
they otherwise seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.") (emphasis added); c.f FED. R. EVID. 103(d) advisory committee's note
("[J]udicial unwillingness to be constricted by mechanical breakdowns of the adversary system
has been more pronounced in criminal cases.").
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Supreme Court has recognized "the awesome responsibility of defending a
person's life."'' As previously noted, counsel for a capital defendant must be
conversant with new United States Supreme Court decisions plus federal and
state decisions of all jurisdictions. 192 Defense counsel must also conduct a
thorough investigation into the facts of the case, often with expert forensic
assistance, and prepare for a rigorous and time-consuming jury selection
process. 93 Beyond this, however, "it is in the sentencing phase that new and
different issues, heretofore unknown, are introduced."' 94 Before the sentencing
phase, counsel must "thoroughly research[] the defendant's entire life."'
95
Pursuant to these ends, counsel faces the daunting challenge of coordinating the
efforts of paralegals, investigators, and forensic and mental health experts.9 6
Given these demands, it should come as no surprise that even experienced
capital litigators will make glaring and prejudicial mistakes. Most lawyers
assigned to represent capital defendants in South Carolina are far from
"experienced capital litigators," thus exacerbating the risk of fundamental,
prejudicial error. A capital defendant should not have to shoulder the burden
of a major lapse on the part of counsel; requiring the defendant to bear this risk
accords insufficient weight to the defendant's interest in a fair trial. 97
Therefore, South Carolina should join the courts of other jurisdictions and
allow review of plain errors in spite of failures by overburdened capital defense
counsel to raise contemporaneous objections at trial.' 9
191. Bailey v. State, 309 S.C. 455, 460, 424 S.E.2d 503, 506 (1992).
192. Id.
193. See id. at 460-61, 424 S.E.2d at 506.
194. Id. at 461,424 S.E.2d at 506-07.
195. Id. at 461, 424 S.E.2d at 507.
196. See id. at 462, 424 S.E.2d at 507. See generally Welsh S. White, Effective
Assistance of Counsel in Capital Cases: The Evolving Standard of Care, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV.
323, 336 (1993) (considering "the evolving standards of care with respect to the capital defense
attorney's obligations to investigate, to make strategic decisions relating to the penalty trial, and
to negotiate plea bargains").
197. In Bailey v. State, 309 S.C. 455, 463, 424 S.E.2d 503, 508 (1992), the court
recognized that capital trial attorneys labor under tremendous stress due to both the nature of the
proceedings and their knowledge that their performance will be scrutinized carefully in post-
conviction proceedings. An unforgiving contemporaneous objection rule only intensifies these
problems and makes it more difficult to recruit able and experienced capital trial attorneys.
198. Other state courts have recognized the importance of plain error in assuring
substantial justice. See, e.g., McMillian v. State, 594 So. 2d 1253, 1262 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991)
(noting that the "[plain error] rule requires that we notice any plain error or defect in the
proceedings under review, whether or not brought to the attention of the trial court, and take
appropriate action when such error has or probably has adversely affected the substantial rights
of the appellant"); Conner v. State, 303 S.E.2d 266, 276-77 (Ga. 1983) (conducting a "review
of the record... [to] conclude that the sentence of death was not imposed under the influence
of passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary factor"); State v. Fox, 760 P.2d 670, 675 (Haw. 1988)
("[W]here plain errors were committed and substantial rights were affected thereby, the errors
'may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the [trial] court."') (quoting
HAw. R. PENAL P. 52(b)); People v. Robinson, 178 N.W.2d 804, 807 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970)
(noting that the plain error rule "requires an appellate court to review the whole case and in
[Vol. 50: 1
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2. Ensuring the Accuracy of the Outcome of the Trial
Allowing a conviction or death sentence to stand despite prejudicial error
conflicts with the Eighth Amendment mandate of heightened reliability in
capital cases. The risk of an unwarranted conviction "cannot be tolerated in a
case in which the defendant's life is at stake."' 99 The need for reliability at the
sentencing phase of a capital trial is even higher:
Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment
than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or
two. Because of that qualitative difference, there is a
corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the
determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a
specific case.2"0
Consequently, appellate courts in all other jurisdictions with the death penalty
do not view their job as complete simply because counsel did not raise a
contemporaneous objection to an error at trial. Instead those courts look to the
seriousness of unpreserved errors affecting the fundamental faimess of the
proceeding or undermining confidence in the outcome.2'
State courts in both death penalty and non-death penalty jurisdictions that
have adopted a plain error rule recognize the right to review plain errors when
those errors have affected the accuracy of a trial's outcome.20 2 As has been
context with that review determine if the error complained of resulted in a miscarriage ofjustice
or if refusal to hold that the error is reversible error is inconsistent with substantial justice");
State v. Marquez, 529 P.2d 283, 286 (N.M. Ct. App. 1974) (stating that "'plain error' has been
characterized . . . 'as grave errors which seriously affect substantial rights of the
accused .... result in a clear miscarriage ofjustice, [or] are obvious"') (quoting United States
v. Campbell 419 F.2d 1144 (5th Cir. 1969)).
199. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637 (1980).
200. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976); see also Mills v.
Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1988) (noting the "high requirement of reliability on the
determination that death is the appropriate penalty"); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428
(1980) ("[I]f a State wishes to authorize capital punishment it has a constitutional responsibility
to tailor and apply its law in a manner that avoids the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the
death penalty.").
201. See, e.g., State v. Ashe, 331 S.E.2d 652, 659 (N.C. 1985) (stating that where an
error violates a defendant's constitutional rights, the "defendant's failure to object is not
[necessarily] fatal to his right to raise the question on appeal").
202. See People v. Kurz, 847 P.2d 194, 195-96 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) (stating that
"[p]lain error exists if [the reviewing court can say with fair assurance], afterreviewing the entire
record, it is evident that the error 'so undermined the fundamental fairness of the trial as to cast
serious doubt on the reliability of thejudgment of conviction') (quoting People v. McClure, 779
P.2d 864, 867 (Colo. 1989)) (en banc); State v. DeMartin, 568 A.2d 1034, 1037 (Conn. App. Ct.
1990) (declining "to review the defendant's unpreserved claim under the doctrine of plain error
which is properly used only to preserve the integrity of the judicial process"); Nimmo v. State,
603 P.2d 386, 395 (Wyo. 1979) (noting that an errorwill notbe regarded as harmful unless there
is "'a reasonable possibility that in the absence of the error the verdict might have been more
37
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recognized by every jurisdiction other than South Carolina, plain error review
of issues not preserved at trial is not only desirable but necessary to assure that
a trial's outcome is accurate.
3. Plain Error Rules Promote Judicial Economy
In addition to providing a necessary safeguard for a capital defendant, a
plain error rule also conserves scarce judicial resources. For example, Maryland
recognizes that the scope of appellate court review includes the right to decide
an unpreserved "issue if necessary or desirable to guide the trial court or to
avoid the expense and delay of another appeal."2 3 Without considering the
costs of continued, time-consuming litigation, the effect of Torrence has been
to disregard all unpreserved errors and channel any claims based on those
errors into post-conviction proceedings. However, this often squanders judicial
resources in unnecessary proceedings. Conscientious post-conviction counsel
must litigate all potential claims. Counsel cannot rely on winning by raising
one egregious error under the rubric of an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim because, if that claim loses, state courts will rarely consider a successive
application forpost-conviction relief.2° To unearth all meritorious claims, post-
conviction counsel must investigate, among other things, the crime, the
prosecution's conduct, the racial composition of the grand and petit juries, and
the post-conviction applicant's mental state. This process involves a complete
and reliable investigation into virtually every aspect of the client's social
history and background. In short, post-conviction representation of a death row
inmate involves an effort equal to that of trial counsel." 5
To provide adequate assistance in representing a death row inmate in post-
conviction proceedings, counsel is entitled to funds for expert and investigative
services.26 Although the legislature set a fee cap of $20,000 for investigative
and expert services,2"7 a post-conviction applicant may receive funds in excess
of the cap if the applicant can show, in exparte proceedings, that the expert
services "were reasonably and necessarily incurred.
20 3
Costs to the judicial system are not limited to the time for investigation and
funds for attorneys, experts, and investigators. In capital cases, evidentiary
hearings, which often take a week or more, are invariably required. In the
meantime, the post-conviction judge must rule on a wide range of motions.
favorable to the defendant") (quoting Reeder v. State, 515 P.2d 969, 973 (Wyo. 1973)).
203. MD. R. App. P. 8-131(a).
204. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-90 (Law. Co-op. 1976); Arnold v. State, 309 S.C.
157, 173, 420 S.E.2d 834, 842 (1992).
205. See generally John H. Blume, An Introduction to Post-Conviction Remedies,
Practice and Procedure in South Carolina, 45 S.C. L. REV. 235 (1994) (providing an overview
of post-conviction practice and the types of claims often raised in these proceedings).
206. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-26 (C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
207. See id.
208. Id. § 16-3-26(D).
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Once the post-conviction judge renders an opinion, appeals to the South
Carolina Supreme Court follow. The plain error rule would help eliminate this
inefficient process.
Similarly, state writs of habeas corpus are no substitute for a plain error
rule. A state writ of habeas corpus is an exceptionally rare remedy, granted
only "'where there has been a 'violation, which, in the setting, constitutes a
denial of fundamental fairness shocking to the universal sense ofjustice."
20 9
Additionally, the state habeas petitioner must have "exhaust[ed] all other
sources of relief."' This option neither promotes judicial economy nor offers
adequate protection to an inmate that suffered prejudicial error, though not
error of the high magnitude to warrant habeas corpus relief.
To avoid such unnecessary expense and delay, most states have adopted
plain error rules."' South Carolina's failure to adopt some mechanism for
addressing serious unpreserved errors means that in many cases issues which
could and should have been resolved on direct appeal will instead be litigated
three to four years after the trial in post-conviction proceedings.22 In cases
involving clear errors that will likely result in reversal, such needless delay
undermines public confidence in the criminal justice system.
4. No Meaningful Alternative Exists to Correct Errors
Except in extreme instances of ineffectiveness of counsel, a capital
defendant may have no meaningful opportunity to have the courts correct
prejudicial error, either in state post-conviction proceedings or m federal habeas
corpus, without a plain error rule. The inadequacy of post-conviction remedies
to address technically defaulted legal errors is discussed above in Part IV.
5. Plain Error Rules Help Prevent Systemic Problems in the
Criminal Justice System
The language in Torrence has been taken to an extreme, resulting in gross,
systemic problems in the administration of the court system. Extreme
interpretations denigrate the trial judge's role and provide solicitors with less
incentive to avoid misconduct. As discussed in Part IV, one benefit of in
favorem vitae was that it caused defense counsel, the solicitor, and the trial
209. State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 69, 406 S.E.2d 315, 328 (1991) (Toal, J.,
concurring) (quoting Butler v. State, 302 S.C. 466,468,397 S.E.2d 87,88 (1990) (quoting State
v. Miller, 84 A.2d 459, 463 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1951))).
210. Id.
211. See, e.g., State v. Bassford, 440 A.2d 1059, 1061 (Me. 1982) (stating that
"multiple trips to the Law Court strain the limited resources of the judicial system and add to the
expense of the criminal process, a cost borne by the public in the overwhelming majority of
criminal cases").
212. See, e.g., State v. Hall, 312 S.C. 95,439 S.E.2d 278 (1994) (addressing only one
issue raised on direct appeal because the other claims were not properly preserved at trial).
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court to be jointly responsible for the defendant's right to a fair trial. A plain
error rule preserves this beneficial feature of infavorein vitae and avoids the
problems associated with the doctrine.23 The judge remains an integral player
in the trial process at all times without being compelled to act on technical or
trivial matters or to second guess trial counsel's strategic decisions. Nothing
about a plain error rule compels the trial judge to assume responsibility for all
of counsel's decisions, eitherbefore or during trial. At the same time, the judge
retains an incentive to oversee the solicitor's conduct and rule on glaring acts
of misconduct that undermine the fairness of the proceedings and threaten the
accuracy of the outcome.
6. All Other Jurisdictions Recognize Plain Error in Capital Cases
Except for South Carolina, appellate courts in every jurisdiction with the
death penalty recognize the utility of plain error in capital cases. Even states
that ordinarily do not recognize plain error make exceptions in capital cases.
For example, Alabama's plain error rule applies only in capital cases:
In all cases in which the death penalty has been imposed,
the court of criminal appeals shall notice any plain error or
defect in the proceedings under review, whether or not
brought to the attention of the trial court, and take appropriate
appellate action by reason thereof, whenever such error has
or probably has adversely affected the substantial right of the
appellant.
214
Courts in other death penalty states similarly recognize the need for plain error
review. For instance, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated that "[b]ecause the
penalty of death is qualitatively different from any other sentence, capital cases
receive heightened scrutiny from this court and we conduct an independent
review, regardless of the failure of defense counsel to object to possible
error. ' 21 5 The Missouri Supreme Court held, en banc, that in death penalty
cases the court will review, ex gratia, unpreserved issues for plain error "to
determine if manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice resulted from the
[error]. 216 Likewise, the Idaho Supreme Court stated:
Death is clearly a different kind of punishment from any other
that may may [sic] be imposed, and [the Idaho Code]
mandates that we examine not only the sentence but the
213. See supra Part IV.B.I.b.
214. ALA. R. App. P. 45A; see also McMillian v. State, 594 So. 2d 1253, 1262 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1991) (relying on Alabama Rule of Appellate Procedure 45A).
215. State v. Thomas, 427 So. 2d 428, 433 (La. 1982).
216. State v. Nave, 694 S.W.2d 729, 735 (Mo. 1985) (en bane).
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procedure followed in imposing that sentence regardless of
whether an appeal is even taken. This indicates to us that we
may not ignore unchallenged errors. Moreover, the gravity of
a sentence of death and the infrequency with which it is
imposed outweighs any rationale that might be proposed to
justify refusal to consider errors not objected to below.217
C. South Carolina and Plain Error
The South Carolina Supreme Court has expressly declined to recognize the
plain error doctrine in criminal cases.218 However, in Toyota ofFlorence, Inc.
v. Lynch 9 the court recognized a limited but significant exception to the
contemporaneous objection rule. Lynch involved a civil lawsuit against a
Japanese corporation. During his closing argument, Lynch's counsel used an
exhibit with mushroom clouds and stereotypical Asian figures. Toyota's trial
counsel failed to object, and the trial judge found that Toyota waived any
objection to the exhibit.22 On appeal the South Carolina Supreme Court
reversed the judgment for Lynch stating that "even in the absence of a
contemporaneous objection, a new trial motion should be granted in flagrant
cases where a vicious, inflammatory argument results in clear prejudice."' ' In
addition, the court noted that it could "hardly conceive of a more outrageous
argument than that made here," finding that "it would be wholly unreasonable
for any attorney to anticipate this type of abhorrent conduct."'
Recently, the South Carolina Supreme Court made it clear that the court
did not adopt a plain error rule in Lynch.2 3 Furthermore, to date South Carolina
courts have appliedLynch's interpretation of the plain error rule only one other
217. State v. Osbom, 631 P.2d 187, 192-93 (Idaho 1981); see also Ross v. State, 482
A.2d 727, 742-43 (Del. 1984) (allowing a defendant convicted of first degree murder to claim
plain error despite the defendant's failure to object at trial); Culberson v. State, 379 So. 2d 499,
506 (Miss. 1979) (en bane) (waiving the requirement that counsel make timely objections in
capital cases); State v. Noland, 320 S.E.2d 642, 651 (N.C. 1984) (finding that although the
defendant failed to object to the prosecutor's remarks, the court would still consider the
defendant's allegation of error on appeal due to the severity of a death sentence), rev'd on other
grounds, Noland v. French, 134 F.3d 208 (4th Cir. 1998); State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261, 265
(Utah 1980) (allowing a capital defendant to raise a prejudicial error in the absence of an
objection).
218. See Jackson v. Speed, 326 S.C. 289, 306, 486 S.E.2d 750, 759 (1997) ("This
Court has consistently refused to apply the plain error rule.").
219. 314 S.C. 257, 442 S.E.2d 611 (1994).
220. Id. at 263,442 S.E.2d at 615.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. See Jacksonv. Speed, 326 S.C. 289,306-07,486 S.E.2d 750,759 (1997) (noting
that Lynch is a limited exception to the contemporaneous objection rule and refusing to adopt
a plain error rule).
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time, also in a civil case.224 However, the precedent should also apply to
criminal cases. On at least one occasion, a criminal defendant has made this
argument. In State v. Pea 2 s the defendant argued that the prosecutor made
flagrantly prejudicial remarks during the closing argument. During this
argument, the prosecutor commented on the defendant's courtroom attire,
stating that the defendant "dressed better to go to the drug deal than he did to
come to court.",16 In addition, the prosecutor stated that the defendant dealt
drugs in the country "[b]ecause they're so stupid it's harder to get caught in the
country."' 27 Relying on Lynch, the defendant argued that the court should
overturn his conviction notwithstanding his counsel's failure to make a timely
objection to the prosecutor's closing argument. However, the South Carolina
Court of Appeals enforced the contemporaneous objection rule, finding the
defendant's arguments procedurally barred.228 The court described Lynch as an
"extraordinary" Case, and explained that the South Carolina Supreme Court
forbade them from addressing issues that counsel failed to preserve properly for
appeal.229 It is not clear when, if ever, the South Carolina Supreme Court would
apply Lynch to an argument made in a criminal case. Given the Eighth
Amendment concerns involved in capital cases, it would be irrational not to
apply the Lynch rule in that setting.
VII. CONCLUSION
Although South Carolina has long been willing, even eager, to swim
against the tide, procedural default rules represent an instance in which the tide,
comprised of all other jurisdictions, is correct. The South Carolina Supreme
Court ignores both the realities of capital trial defense and its own
responsibility to ensure that death sentences are obtained in compliance with
the United States Constitution and other applicable law. By jettisoning in
favorem vitae review to remedy alleged abuses by defense counsel, and by
capriciously applying its default rules, the South Carolina Supreme Court set
off an atomic bomb to kill a gnat. The court's "solution" to alleged problems
has spawned far more serious problems than it solved: expensive, time-
consuming, and unnecessary litigation, and tolerance for unreliable death
sentences, to name a few." Adoption ofaplain error rule would partially solve
224. See Dial v. Niggel Assocs., Inc., 326 S.C. 329,476 S.E.2d 700 (Ct. App. 1996)
(per curiam).
225. 321 S.C. 405, 468 S.E.2d 669 (Ct. App. 1996).
226. Id. at 412, 468 S.E.2d at 673.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 412-13, 468 S.E.2d at 673-74.
229. Id. at 413, 468 S.E.2d at 674.
230. Formation of a statewide capital trial defender unit would solve more problems.
Unlike private attorneys who lack sufficient time, resources, or specialized knowledge, lawyers
in such a unit could stay abreast of developing issues pertinent to capital defense and thus be
well equipped to protect defendants' rights by raising the relevant issues at trial. A capital trial
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the problems createdby Torrence andwould address the court's concerns about
"sandbagging" and proper operation of the adversarial process.
In the meantime, capital defense lawyers should study the court's
procedural rulings and be prepared to make detailed objections on all pertinent
state and federal grounds, renew objections at every opportunity, and defend
the adequacy of objections on appeal. Because capital defendants face an
especially serious penalty, their legal claims deserve especially serious
consideration. Fundamental principles of justice require no less.
defender unit could also level the playing field by giving experienced solicitors worthy
adversaries-attorneys fully capable of safeguarding capital defendants' rights and preventing
prosecutorial attempts to circumvent the demands of the Constitution and other pertinent law.
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TABLE 1








ALA. R. App. P. 39(k) ("In all cases in
which the death penalty has been
imposed,... the Supreme Court may notice
any plain error or defect in the proceeding
under review, whether or not brought to the
attention of the trial court.... ."); id. 45A
(stating that the court "shall notice any
plain error or defect") (emphasis added).
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2102(A)
(West 1956) ("Upon an appeal from a final
judgment, the supreme court shall review
any intermediate orders involving the merits
of the action and necessarily affecting the
judgment, and all orders and rulings
assigned as error, whether a motion for new
trial was made or not.").
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-603(d) (Michie
1997) ("[I]f the Arkansas Supreme Court
finds that the jury erred in finding the
existence of any aggravating circumstance
or circumstances for any reason and if the
jury found no mitigating circumstances, the
Arkansas Supreme Court shall conduct a
harmless error review of the defendant's
death sentence.").
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1258 (West 1982)
("After hearing the appeal, the Court must
give judgment without regard to technical
errors or defects, or to exceptions, which do
not affect the substantial rights of the
parties.").
COLO. R. CRIM. P. 52(b) ("Plain errors or
defects affecting substantial rights may be
noticed although they were not brought to
the attention of the court.").
[Vol. 50: 1
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CONNECTICUT CONN. R. APP. P. § 60-5 ("The court [on
appeal] may in the interests ofjustice notice
plain error not brought to the attention of
the trial court.").
DELAWARE DEL. CT. C.P.R. 52(b) ("Plain errors or
defects affecting substantial rights may be
noticed although they were not brought to
the attention of the court.").
FLORIDA FLA. STAT. ANN. § 924.33 (West 1996)
("No judgment shall be reversed unless the
appellate court is of the opinion, after an
examination of all the appeal papers, that
error was committed that injuriously
affected the substantial rights of the
appellant.").
GEORGIA GA. R. UNIFIED APPEAL IV(B)(2):
[In capital cases, t]he Supreme
Court shall review each of the
assertions of error timely raised by
the defendant during the
proceedings in the trial court
regardless of whether or not an
assertion of error was presented to
the trial court by motion for new
trial, and regardless of whether
error is enumerated in the Supreme
Court.
IDAHO IDAHO CODE §§ 19-2515, -2827 (1997 &
Supp. 1998). Also see State v. Osbom, 631
P.2d 187, 192-93 (Idaho 1981), where the
Idaho Supreme Court stated:
Death is clearly a different kind of
punishment from any other that
may may [sic] be imposed, and
[Idaho Code] § 19-2827 mandates
that we examine not only the
sentence but the procedure
followed in imposing that sentence
regardless of whether an appeal is
even taken. This indicates to us
that we may not ignore
45
Blume and Wilkins: Death by Default: State Procedural Default Doctrine in Captial Ca
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
unchallenged errors. Moreover, the
gravity of a sentence of death and
the infrequency with which it is
imposed outweighs any rationale
that might be proposed to justify
refusal to consider errors not
objected to below.
ILLINOIS ILL. SUP. CT. R. 615(a) ("Plain errors or
defects affecting substantial rights may be
noticed although they were not brought to
the attention of the trial court.").
INDIANA Lowery v. State, 478 N.E.2d 1214, 1229
(Ind. 1985) ("The failure to properly raise
issues in the Motion to Correct Errors
generally results in a waiver of the claimed
errors. Since the death penalty was imposed
in this [case], however, we will review the
state of the record concerning these
questions.") (citations omitted).
KANSAS State v. Novotny, 851 P.2d 365, 367 (Kan.
1993) ("[T]he failure to give [an]
instruction is 'clearly erroneous [permitting
reversal despite the absence of a
contemporaneous objection when the]
reviewing court reaches a firm conviction
that if the trial error had not occurred there
was a real possibility the jury would have
returned a different verdict."') (quoting
State v. Novotny, 837 P.2d 1327, 1330
(Kan. Ct. App. 1992) (quoting State v.
DeMoss, 770 P.2d 441,445 (Kan. 1989))).
KENTUCKY KY. R. CIV. P. 61.02 ("A palpable error
which affects the substantial rights of a
party may be considered by... an appellate
court on appeal, even though insufficiently
raised or preserved for review .... ."). Rule
61.02 applies to criminal procedure. See
KY. R. CRIM. P. 13.04.
LOUISIANA LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 841, 920
(West 1997); see also State v. Thomas, 427
[Vol. 50: 1
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MISSISSIPPI
So. 2d 428, 433 (La. 1982) ("Because the
penalty of death is qualitatively different
from any other sentence, capital cases
receive heightened scrutiny from this court
and we conduct an independent review,
regardless of the failure of defense counsel
to object to possible error...
MD. R. APP. P. 8-131(a):
[T]he appellate court will not
decide any other issue unless it
plainly appears by the record to
have been raised in or decided by
the trial court, but the Court may
decide such an issue if necessary
or desirable to guide the trial court
or to avoid the expense and delay
of another appeal.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-39-21(1) (1994)
("Failure by a prisoner to raise
objections .. .shall constitute a waiver
thereof and shallbe procedurally barred, but
the court may upon a showing of cause and
actual prejudice grant relief from the
waiver."); see also Brooks v. State, 46 So.
2d 94, 97 (Miss. 1950) (in banc) ("Errors
affecting fundamental rights are exceptions
to the rule that questions not raised in the
trial court cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal.") (citations omitted).
Mo. R. CRIM. P. 29.12(b) ("Plain errors
affecting substantial rights may be
considered in the discretion of the court
when the court finds that manifest injustice
or miscarriage of justice has resulted
therefrom.").
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-20-104(2) (1997)
("Upon appeal from a judgment, the court
may review the verdict or decision and any
alleged error objected to which involves the
merits or necessarily affects the
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may not be reversed by reason of any error
committed by the trial court against the
convicted person unless the record shows
that the error was prejudicial.").
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1919 (1995) ("The
Court of Appeals or Supreme Court may at
its option consider a plain error not
specified in appellant's brief.").
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 178.602 (Michie
1997) ("Plain errors or defects affecting
substantial rights may be noticed although
they were not brought to the attention of the
court.").
State v. Hannan, 631 A.2d 531, 534 (N.H.
1993) ("The analysis to determine the effect
of a federal constitutional error is the same
as that applied to violations of the State
Constitution: the error will require reversal
unless it is shown 'beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error complained of did not
contribute to the verdict obtained."')
(quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S.
18, 24 (1967)).
N.J. R. APP. P. 2:10-2 ("[T]he appellate
court may, in the interests ofjustice, notice
plain error not brought to the attention of
the trial or appellate court.").
N.M. R. App. P. 12-216(B) ("This rule shall
not preclude the appellate court from
consideringjurisdictional questions or, in its
discretion, questions involving: (1) general
public interest; or (2) fundamental error or
fundamental rights of a party.").
State v. Ashe, 331 S.E.2d 652, 659 (N.C.
1985) ("Where . . . the error violates
defendant's right to a trial by a jury of
twelve, defendant's failure to object is not
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OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2309.59
(Anderson 1995) ("In every stage of an
action, the court shall disregard any error or
defect in the pleadings or proceedings
which does not affect the substantial rights
of the adverse party.").
Bingham v. State, 165 P.2d 646, 651-52
(Okla. Crim. App. 1946) ("[I]n a capital
case, all errors alleged to have been
committed during the trial of the defendant
will be considered whether such assigned
errors were presented to the lower court or
properly raised by motion for new trial.").
OR. REV. STAT. § 138.220 (1990) ("Upon
an appeal, the judgment or order appealed
from can be reviewed only as to questions
of law appearing upon the record."); see
also State v. Johnson 521 P.2d 355, 356
(Or. Ct. App. 1974) ("Questions not timely
raised and preserved in the trial court will
not be considered on appeal in the absence
of exceptional circumstances.").
Commonwealth v. McKenna, 383 A.2d
174, 181 (Pa. 1978):
Because imposition of the death
penalty is irrevocable in its finality,
it is imperative that the standards
by which that sentence is fixed be
constitutionally beyond reproach.
.. . The waiver rule cannot be
exalted to a portion so lofty as to
require this Court to blind itself to
the real issue-the propriety of
allowing the state to conduct an
illegal execution of a citizen.
NO PLAIN ERROR DOCTRINE
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-44-15 (Michie
1998) ("Plain errors or defects affecting
substantial rights may be noticed although
they were not brought to the attention of a
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TENN. R. CIM. P. 52(b) ("An error which
has affected the substantial rights of an
accused may be noticed at any time, even
though not raised in the motion for a new
trial or assigned as error on appeal, in the
discretion of the appellate court where
necessary to do substantial justice.").
TEX. CRIM. P. CODE ANN. art. 36.19 (West
1981) (stating, in part, that "the judgment
shall not be reversed unless the error
appearing from the record was calculated to
injure the rights of defendant"); see also
Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171
(Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (en banc) (noting
that, "if no proper objection was made at
trial [the accused] will obtain a reversal
only if the error is so egregious and created
such harm that he 'has not had a fair and
impartial trial'-in short 'egregious
harm"').
State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261, 265 (Utah
1980) ("[N]o objection was made to the
omission. Nevertheless, as this is a capital
case, we consider the defendant's
contention on appeal.").
VA. R. CRIM. P. 52(b) ("Plain errors or
defects affecting substantial rights may be
noticed although they were not brought to
the attention of the court.").
WASH. R. APP. P. 2.5(A); see also State v.
Scott, 757 P.2d 492, 495 (Wash. 1988) (en
banc) ("The proper way to approach claims
of constitutional error [is to determine first
whether] the error is truly of constitutional
magnitude . . . . If the claim is
constitutional, then the court should
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WYOMING WYO. R. CRIM. P. 52(b) ("Plain errors or
defects affecting substantial rights may be
noticed although they were not brought to
the attention of the court.").
All of the states listed above, except Alabama and Arkansas, apply their
plain error rules to all criminal cases. Alabama limits its plain error rule to
capital cases, and Arkansas applies its rule to those cases in which the
defendant faces either the death penalty or a life sentence. Also, Colorado,
Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Minnesota, Nevada, North
Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming have
adopted Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b).
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TABLE 2








ALASKA CONST. art. I § 9; see Bland v.
State, 846 P.2d 815, 821 (Alaska Ct. App.
1993) (finding no plain error because, "[o]n
review of the current record for plain error,
we find the sentence at least arguably
appropriate").
D.C. SUP. CT. R. CRIM. P. 52(b) ("Plain
errors or defects affecting substantial rights
may be noticed although they were not
brought to the attention of the Court.").
HAW. R. PENAL P. 52(b) ("Plain errors or
defects affecting substantial rights may be
noticed although they were not brought to
the attention of the court.").
State v. Martin, 55 N.W.2d 258, 260-61
(Iowa 1952) (citations omitted):
[A]n exception to the general rule
that questions not raised in the trial
court will not be considered on
appeal exists in case of material
defects which are apparent on the
face of the record and which are
fundamental in their character, or
which clearly show manifest
injustice, especially in capital
cases.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 33E
(West 1998); see Commonwealth v.
Miranda, 490 N.E.2d 1195, 1198-201
(Mass. App. Ct. 1986) (outlining five
exceptions to the contemporaneous
objection rule for plain errors at trial).




South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 1 [], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol50/iss1/3
1998] STATE PROCEDURAL DEFAULT DOCTRiNE IN CAPITAL CASES
No judgment or verdict shall be set
aside or reversed or a new trial be
granted by any court of this state in
any criminal case... unless in the
opinion of the court, after an
examination of the entire cause, it
shall affirmatively appear that the
error complained of has resulted in






MINN. R. CRIM. P. 31.02 ("Plain errors or
defects affecting substantial rights may be
considered by the court upon motions for new
trial, post-trial motions, and on appeal although
they were not brought to the attention of the trial
court.").
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 470.15 (McKinney
1994) ("[A]n intermediate appellate
court . . . may consider and determine any
question of law or issue of fact involving error
or defect in the criminal court proceedings
which may have adversely affected the
appellant.").
N.D. R. CRIM. P. 52(b) ("Obvious errors or
defects affecting substantial rights may be
noticed although they were not brought to the
attention of the court.").
P.R. R. EVID. 6 ("Nothing in Rules 4 and 5
[regarding erroneous admission and exclusion of
evidence] precludes an appellate court from
taking notice of plain and harmful errors... in
spite of the absence of a timely objection, when
the failure to correct said errors would result in
a miscarriage of justice.")
State v. Williams, 432 A.2d 667, 670 (R.I.
1981) ("[E]rrors not asserted in the trial court
will only be considered under extraordinary
circumstances wherein a defendant has'suffered
an abridgment of his basic constitutional
rights."') (quoting State v. Frazier, 235 A.2d
886, 887 (R.I. 1967) (per curiam)).
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VT. R. CRIM. P. 52(b) ("Plain errors or defects
affecting substantial rights may be noticed
although they were not brought to the attention
of the court.").
W. VA. R. CRIM. P. 52(b) ("Plain errors or
defects affecting substantial rights may be
noticed although they were not brought to the
attention of the court.").
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 901.03(4) (West 1993)
("Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of
plain errors affecting substantial rights although
they were not brought to the attention of the
judge."); see Virgil v. State, 267 N.W.2d 852,
865 (Wis. 1978) ("Where a defendant is
convicted in a way inconsistent with the fairness
and integrity of judicial proceedings, then the
courts should invoke the plain-error rule in order
to protect their own public reputation.").
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